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This thesis is m attempt to ev"aluate the attitude of the Athenian 
demos during the tormati ve years of the Cleisthenian democracy. 
The dissertation tries to trace the events of the period from the mpul-
sion of Hippian to the ~ttle of Sal.amis. Ma.tural.ly no strict chronological 
sequence can be foll.amtd.. The events are known to us only f'ragmen~. 
some additional archaeological Wormation has trickled dcmn to us 1n the 
last tro decad.all 11h1ch shed light on the edating historical data prO\Tided 
ma:1nly by Herodotus md Arletotle. On other instanc• the argument ax 
-
eilentio is empl.C)Jed to supplement the tactual mt.erial. 
The exam:lnation of the period demonstrates that thc:re wre two strong 
trends prevalent 1n the lite of the A than.an Democra.oy1 a moderate and m 
extremist. The sucaesa ot the Cleisthenian reforms 1n11S main]¥ dDe to the 
moderate tone of his leg:lalation. Cle1.athenes1 tlto knew the Athenians veU, 
realized that he had to keep the political. atmosphere "cool,• it his re£ort.W 
bad my chance tor auooess. This is the md. n reum he deliberately avoided 
to indulge in the application of oatraoism a.gal Zl8t the relatives of the Pi-
aiatratids. ¥ihen Cleisthenes passed out of the political scene, political 
.t'anaticism f!):'SV1 graduall\f' md became the cause for the blunde:rs 'Ill ioh the 
Athenians conm.ttect. New men md nar ia!JU.e8 appeared around 500 B.c. which 
divided the voters deepl;r. In the midst ot the critical situation the Athen-
18Zl8 acted erraticall;r• They fat.led to formulate my policies that could be 
characterized either as.U-thou.~ht out or consistent. Once they bad weather... 
ed. the cris1.a of 490, they lapsed again to petty hatreds and personal animoai-
2 
ties which further divided them. when greater unity was needed in the face 
of the grave danger which atill threatened them from ·the East. They gave 
vent to their pettiness ~ emplayine; the instifu:tlon of oetraoism for the 
elimination of their political opponents. Ostracism, which was invented 
by Cleisthenes for the protection o:t democra..oy1 was now used by the majOl\ioo 
ity as a political ftD.pon agai.nst the leadership ot the minority. As a 
result, politioal intolenmoei.-.so fateful to the Oreoks-ns inoreaeed, aid 
inatead o£ the Mends o£ the tyrants, the friends md relatives o:t the 
inventor ot ostracism wwe ban:Lahed. It Greece was .finally saved 1n 4801 
thil was chietl\v due to that maver,5.ck 1h o bore part of the responeibility 
tor the eventa of the previows deoade1 'l'hem18tooles. In the hour of 
Greece's extreme perll1 he applied his mpromely practical. genius aid h1s 
bnlliant foresight for the aalvation of Greece. The political Vices 
which ~ed the Atheniam before Salamis continued. to do"'. them through-
out their lite• Needless to eq that the same Vices atnicted all the 
Greeks. Their aelf was their WI rst erlellV• Had they subt'ned their sel.£1 
the face of the Ancient Neal- East m uld have been different todlv'. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It has been said that individuals who forgive themselves 
little mistakes often end up forgiving their big mistakes as well 
with deleterious effects. The same thing is true about nations. 
Among them the Greeks have overindulged in this practice with 
nefarious results on their own political existence. Western 
scholars, dazzled b7 the striking accomplishments of the Greeks, 
have often tended to forgive them their political excesses and to 
disregard Greek political foibles. The7 often approach Greek 
political histor7 with an aura of awe. And 7et the face of the 
whole Near East would have been different if the Greeks had mas-
tered the art of self-rule. This paper is an effort to exemplif7 
this facet of histo~ and the inconsistenc7 of Greek political 
behavior. The period 510-480 B.C. is important because it is the 
formative period in Athenian Deaocrac7 and because of the re-
sponse of that Democrac7 to the dangers that threatened her from 
the outside. There is no intention here to rehash the old argu-
ments about the Cleisthenian reforms. These have been thorough17 
investigated b7 scholars and nothing definitive can be said un-
less new evidence appears--an unlikel1 thing. The onl7 exception 
is the problem of ostracism. Since this question is indispensa-
ble to this work I had to examine it in detail. M7 purpose has 
been to add my own insights to the period for whatever the1 are 
worth. If I have relied to a great ext~nt on historioal conjec-
ture, this is due to the tragmenta~ nature of the information. 
M1 onl7 defense is that I am not the onl7 sinner in this respect. 
2 
Inevita.bl1 a discussion on the period has to revolve pri-
maril1 on Herodotus. He is indispensable, but not satisfactory. 
Herodotus makes reference to the domestic affairs of Athens dur-
ing this period but only in passing. His main interest is the 
Persian Wars. One would wish that in the place of the numerous 
stories that he often narrates, he would have given us some per-
tinent information on the Athenian political scene. Thuc1dides 
has almost nothing to sa1 about this period except by accident. 
Our richest source is Aristotle, or whoever wrote the Athenaion 
Politeia that goes under his name. But even this source tele-
scopes the events of the period. Besides, it was written a cen-
tury and a half later and had to be based on others whose relia-
bility escapes us. Plutarch has a lot to sa1, but he too wrote 
later and his information must be used with caution. Other 
fragmentary evidence is available but that does not enable us to 
draw a definitive conclusion. Recently, archaeological evidence 
has been produced which is of great value for the historian of 
this period. 
Even though additional footnotes would have given a more 
11scholarl1" appearance to this paper, I have avoided excessive 
documentation. I footnoted only when absolutely necessary. 
I wish to thank Dr. George Szemler for his valuable sug-
gestions that consumed some of his invaluable time; the members 
of the committee, the Reverend Thomas Bogan and Dr. Hana Gross, 
who have examined this paper; and Mrs. Christine Karavites who 
patientl1 typed and retyped the several drafts of this disserta-
tion. 
CHAPTER I 
FROM CRISIS TO CRISIS 
In the latter part of the first half of the sixth century, 
B.c.1 the political divisions in Athens led to some kind of a 
coup which put an end briefly to the political bickering of the 
Athenian factions. 2 
The story of Herodotus about Pisistratus' wounds and beat-
ing was cleverly exaggerated and exploited by Pisistratus for his 
political ends. 3 It led to the abolition of the constitution. 
Thus it was the first time after the modern and compromising leg-
islation of Solom that the political extremism of the Greeks 
1All dates mentioned heretofore refer to the Before 
Christ period unless otherwise indicated. 
2It seems that the coup of Pisistratus was symbolic in 
some respects of the future trend of Hellenic politics, ancient 
or modern. Whenever an impasse is reached because of the inabil-
ity of the Greeks to bury temporarily, at least, their hatchets 
and proceed with the normal business of the state, a "savior" ap-
pears who, in the name of "order," "law," ttnational dignity, 11 and 
the "national good," undertakes to suspend or abolish the exist-
ing constitution and rule the state in a personal manner. To 
this "rule" the exception had been the Spartans until their sys-
tem too was undermined from internal and external developments 
and caved in after the Battle of Mantinea. Socrates and Plato, 
Thucydides, and others were not philo-Laconians. The1 simply ad-
mired the orderliness of the Spartan government and they violent-
11 disliked the weakness of their own government, a weakness 
which mainly arose from the fact that any "fool" could decide the 
affairs of the state without any prior knowledge and thought on 
the business of state on which he was casting his vote. As long 
as Pericles was to contain the crowd, the Athenian Democrac1, 
without any strong checks and balances, somehow worked. But when 
the voice of Pericles was eclipsed, the evils of the system or 
rather the political weaknesses of the Greeks were made once 
again manifest. 
3Hdt I, 59,4. Aristotle, Ath. Pol. ("Oxford Classical 
Texts"), 14,1. 
resulted in an unconstitutional solution of their political af-
fairs. 
Pisistratus must have realized that there was no other 
way of implementing some of the program to which he was commit-
ted as the leader of the Poor Party, or of occupying the power to 
which he openly aspired. 1 It is to his honor that once occupying 
the government he used power with moderation thereby establishing 
a precedent that was to be followed by almost all the revolution-
ary governments in Greece up to this day. 
Once in control, Pisistratus proved to be a natural politi-
cian who understood power and knew how to use it. He operated 
from the beginning with a mixture of autocracy and measured democ-
racy. 
While Pisistratus' rule was not yet well rooted the erst-
while enemies of Pisistratus, themselves mutual enemies, were 
temporarily reconciled; they formed a coalition and succeeded in 
driving Pisistratus out of office. 2 But "it takes only a short 
1Charles Hignett, A__,H_.,s--.o~r~....,.;..-,;i;.;;;:;;-...,...~---.. ....... .--~._..,..,;;.a 
to he End t the Fif Centur B.C. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1952 , p. 109. The author speaks about the three parties of the 
period. His explanation is at its best conjectural. He makes 
the Hyperakrioi split away from the Paralioi. The Paralioi were 
contented with Solon's reforms whereas the Hzperakrioi demanded 
further Agrarian reforms. Bignett prefers the testimony of Hero-
dotus (Hdt I, 59,3) over that of Plutarch (Plutarch, Solon 13, 
1-2) who makes all these parties contemporaries. Other names for 
the HlPerakrioi are Diakrioi (Ath. Pol. 13,4) and Epakrioi (Plu-
tarch, Moralia ?63D). 
2Bdt I, 59,6; Thuc. VI, 54,6; Ath. Pol. 14,1-2. Exam-
ples of the above statements are the government of Four Hundred, 
Demetrius Phalereus, even the present government of Greece. A 
notable exception is the government of the thirties after the 
Peloponnesian War. The fact that they did not stay long in power 
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time to break up the intimacies of the base. 111 This political 
s1111biosis could not last long, and the two were soon at odds. 2 
Perhaps the overbearing Alcmeonids did not find their partner as 
tractable as they wanted, and out of spite they upset the former 
alliance of necessity only to form a similar one with the man 
they had worked to expel. The political "reconciliation" is 
sealed with what they probably believed to be firmer bonds of 
union. A marriage was arranged between Pisistratus and Megacles' 
daughter.3 The marriage was a marriage of convenience, and 
Pisistratus, who probably did not trust the Alcmeonids anyway, 
failed to consumate the "double marriage. 114 Once again the Ale-
meonids are estranged, and Pisistratus is forced to take to 
flight because he lacked the strong basis that was needed and 
without which he could not easily defy the strength of the Alcme-
onids. He is forced to flee for the second time. His second 
exile forces him to reconsider his position vis-A-vis the politi-
and that within that short period of time they left a legacy of 
bitterness, indicates, in my mind, that they had violated the 
protocol of revolutionary behavior. Also Thuc. VIII, 97,2. 
61.€.A.uo-l ••• • 11.c.C ~&~ ~tv ~WV qio:ui\wv OUVT).ftt:Co:s; 6A.Cyo~ xp6vo~ 
Isocra tes, On Dem9ndtSUlS I ("Loeb Classical Library"; Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1960). Hereafter all translations con-
tained in this paper are from the Loeb Classical Library unless 
otherwise indicated. Bdt I, 60,1; Ath. Pol. 14,3. Athenian 
politics between 510--480 have been the object of many studies 
conducted by scholars on both aides of the Atlantic. For a guide 
to earlier bibliography see C. A. Robinson, Jr., "Athenian Poli-
tics 510-486," American Journal of Philologz, LXVI (1945), 243-
254. 
2Hdt I, 60,1 2; A.th. Pol. ll+,4. 
3Hdt I, 61,1; Ath. Pol. 14,4. 
4Hdt I, 61,1; Ath. Pol. 15,1. 
6 
cal realities in Athens. It was clear to him that he ought to 
broaden his basis, if he were to have an1 hopes of return. He 
therefore made alliances outside of Athens and acquired the eco-
l 
nomic independence that he needed to operate freel7. With a band 
of mercenaries dependent on Pisistratus' pa1 he landed at Mara-
thon and made his way to Athens with great ease. 2 It was a 0 Bay 
of Pigs" operation in reverse. The people in Athens were tired 
of the political acrobatics of the Alcmeonids and the resultant 
instabilit7 and disorder. The1 were now ready to welcome a 
change, and Pisistratus, who was probabl7 well apprized of the 
political sentiment prevailing in Athens at that time, satisfied 
the craving. Herodotus sarcastically states: "and while en-
camped there they were joined by their partisans from the cit1, 
and by others who flocked to them from the country demes--men who 
loved the rule of one more than freedom."3 Herodotus• sarcasm is 
only partl1 justifiable. In a "fine" manner he derides the Athe-
nians because they willingly exchanged their freedom for tyranny 
--"men who loved the rule of one more than freedom." He fails, 
however, to note that the worst enemy of freedom and democracy is 
political instability and disorder. 4 All the Athenians were 
1Hdt I, 61,4; Atu. Po •• 15, 2-3· 
2iJdt I, 62,l; 6th, fpl. 15, 4-5· 
3Hdt I, 62,1 • 
.•. ~voe TOUTW TW xwpw cr~L crTpa~onEOEUOµEVOLUL 
ot TE ~~ TOij ~cr~eo, UTQULWTaL ~nCx9vTo,~AAQL 
TE1t¥,TWY OijUW~,npocrtcgeav. ~OLUL n ~upaVVLS 4 r~pu E.:/\.£1J{}Ep Lt'1' qv aanll ~o-rc:pov. 
W. W, How and J. Wells, A Co111J1entar~ on Herodotus (Ox-
ford: Clarendon Press, 1912), I, So. XtE: JC1. 8,4 and 1~ 1 10. 
Hdt I, 29,2. 
7 
responsible for this chaotic situation that eventuated into tyran-
ny and more so those who in their capacity as leaders bore on 
their shoulders the greater weight of responsibility for the pres-
ervation of the public trust. In this context, then, his friends, 
the Alcmeonids, were directly responsible for the tyranny because 
they had persistently cultivate a climate of political uncertainty. 
Pisistratus was responsible for violating the Solonian 
constitution twice before. 1 Solon's constitution made provisions 
for the punishment of those who conspired for the overthrow of the 
state through some kind or impeachment. 2 But then the others, and 
especially the Alcmeonids, were equally responsible for the viola-
tion of the constitution not only as being guilty by association, 
but because they were directly responsible for the anomalous situ-
ation which produced the violent solutions. The people themselves 
were guilty also because they did not care to argue about "fine" 
constitutional points as long as their whims were satisfied. 
Right now, they were simply tired of the political hegemony of the 
erratic Alcmeonids and welcomed the change, even if it means a 
violation of the constitution, a violation which they probably did 
not see or care to regard. It was a clear case of accepting an 
antidote which led to the opposite extreme, the extreme of violat-
ing the legally established order. The solution is so character-
1Aristotle, Politics, 1315b.5. 
2Ath, Pol. 8,4. Aristotle does not spell out the exact 
provisions for the punishment of the offenders. He says that 
Solon assigned to the Council of Areopagus the duty of superin-
tending the laws, acting as before as the guardian of the consti-
tution in general. 
8 
istic of the politically impatient and moody Greeks! 
Here one should stop for a minute and pose the question: 
What was the nature of the Athenian parties? What was the rela-
tionship between the members of those parties and their leaders? 
The pattern does not necessarily conform entirel1 to anything to 
which we are accustomed. It exhibits a peculiarit1 which is, 
however, consonant with the Greek character, an inconsistenc7 
which is consistent with the Greek nature. Party differences 
and principles are blurred and political behavior t;rpically atypi-
cal. Did, for instance, Lycourgus and Megacles agree in principle 
on the polic7 affecting their followers when they decided to re-
move Pisastratus from office? We do not have details of their 
dealings, and perhaps one could argue that they might have dis-
agreed on policy, but they both agreed in principle against 
t7rann7. But then what of the covenant made by Pisistratus and 
Megacles which resulted in the return of Pisistratus to power? 
Again one could argue that Lycourgus and Megacles disagreed on 
policy, and therefore the return of Pisistratus would be expedi-
ent to the followers of Megacles who, after all, stood to suffer 
from the monopoly of power and privileges exercised by the mem-
bers of the party led by Lycourgus. But surely the behavior of 
Megacles which resulted in the second expulsion of Pisistratus 
stemmed from personal motives1 to which the followers of Megacles• 
party were not privy. It is evident then that the Greek "parties" 
of this period were factions led by noble families resembling 
l Ath, Pol. 14, 3-4. 
9 
somewhat the political factions in the southern states of the 
United States. The relationship between the leaders and the group 
members is at the least confusing. These leaders acted on occa-
sions without regard for the wishes of their members. If a pa.rt1 
is a bod1 of men united for promoting b1 their joint endeavor the 
national interest upon some particular principle on which the1 all 
agreed, it is very difficult to see on what principles the parties 
of Kegacles and Lycourgus and Pisistratus agreed except likes and 
dislikes of one another, sometimes superficial and other times 
permanent. One could argue in this case that no particular prin-
ciple serves to bind Senator Edward Kenned1 of Massachusetts and 
James Eastland of Mississippi or on the other side Senator J. 
Strom Thurmond of South Carolina and Edmund Brooke of Massachu-
setts. Clearl1 principles vary from one member to another within 
both parties, and all the members of both parties are united in 
their desire to win control of the government. They all identif1 
themselves with the party by having a choice within it. But then 
how much choice did the followers of Megacles have in the dealings 
of their leader? 
If political parties serve to moderate the differences 
among opposing groups, to stabilize political allegiance and to 
bring order out of chaos from the multitude of voters, the parties 
of Lycourgus, Kegaoles, and Pisistratus did nothing of the sort. 
They lacked consistency of behavior because of their personal and 
limited character. Therefore, the consistenc1 in their political 
manifestations was the irrational manner with which they persist-
10 
ently acted. The divisions among the Athenians mentioned by both 
Aristotle and Herodotus1 for the period prior to 510 are politi-
call1 obscure. Tb.ere were no hard lines drawn among them and the 
attitude of their leaders as well as the family descent of the 
party leaders illustrate this. Herodotus himself alludes very 
subtly to this in the case of Pisistratus, "in the course of time 
there was a feud between the Athenians of the coast under Mega-
oles, son of Alcmeon, and the Athenians of the plain under Ly-
courgus, son of Aristolaides. Pisistratus then, having an eye to 
the sovereign power, raised up a third faction. He collected par-
tisans and pretended to champion the hillmen. 112 The implication 
here is that Pisistratus was not necessarily a sincere partisan 
of his party. His leadership of the Hill party was an historical 
accident due to the fact that others were already in command of 
the other parties. Herodotus is biased in favor of the Alcmeon-
ids, but his statement cannot be lightly dismissed on this account. 
I think it contains a glimpse of the truth and gives us an inkling 
into the workings of Greek politics. Perhaps the same is true 
about the position of the Alcmeonids. Their leadership of the 
:paralioi (part1 of the coaat), whoever they were, was motivated 
neither by economic interests nor by ideology. Herodotus does 
not tell us how and why Megacles became leader of the paralioi, 
1 Hdt I, 59,3. Ash. fol. 13,4. 
2~ifu 79~~ ••• B, 01a01aCov~wv ~wv nap&Awv KaC ~wv Ex_~ou t u A{f"tjvaCwvz KaL_~wv ~tv npoEs~w~o' MEya~Ato~ 
~ou AAxµtwvo,, ~wv 6£ tx ~ou nE6Lou Auxoupyou ~~ou) ApLa-
~oAat6Ew, ~a~a~po~~OQ~ ~UV ~upqvvC6" ~YELpE ~9L~DV a~&qLv, 
ouAAl'a~ bt o~aoLw~a' xa' ~w A6yw ~wv DnEpaKpLwv xpoo~a' 
µDxava~QL ~oL&6E. • 
ll 
1 
as Pisistratus did, or for a 
more lofty purpose, a desire to serve the public. It too may have 
been an historical mutation only because the leadership of the 
nobles was preempted or because of a personal antagonism toward 
the dominant personalities of the party of the nobles. Anyway, it 
seems from Herodotus' vantage that the interests of the leaders 
did not coincide with the interest of the party. The leaders were 
members of the nobility. They looked upon their followers as the 
political instrument that would have enabled them to fulfill their 
personal and political desires, whereas the followers hoped for 
more concrete political benefits. Yet there was no unanimity 
about the nature of these benefits. 
Pisistratus' return signaled the flight of the Alcmeonids2 
who in their exile worked for the overthrow of Pisistratus and ac-
quired the title of misotyrannoi.3 The title was so far inappro-
priate for the collaborators of the tyrant, especially since their 
present activities had personal motives rather than concern with 
oonst~tutional orthodoxy. For the rest, the people were contented 
4 
with the mild rule of Pisistratus, and if the people are the 
source of all sovereignty and legitimacy, the constitutional legal-
ity or not of Pisistratus' rule at this point is of very little 
l Bdt I, 59,3. 2 Bdt I, 64,3. 
3Ma.lcolm F. McGregor, "The Pro-Persian Party at Athens 
from 510-480 B.c. 11 in Athenian Studies Presented to W. s. Fergu-
son Harvard Studies in Classical Phi olo (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Preas, 19 0 , Suppl. I, pp. 71-73. Hdt VI, 121,l and 
123,1. 
4 Ath. Pol. 16, 1-2. 
12 
theoretical value. But even from the practical standpoint the 
discussion would be of little value, and the first to have recog-
nized the futility of their opposition were the Alcmeonida. 
Pisistratus died a peaceful death in 527.1 His memory 
was consecrated in the mind of the people. Modern historians, 
overzealous as they often are for constitutional niceties, have 
also accepted the rule of Pisistratus as a period of positive re-
turns. Historians chose tu overlook their scruples about consti-
tutionalitiea. 
About twenty years after Pisistratus' third rule the 
sting was taken out of all opposition and all parties in Athens 
usher in the now period of the rule of Pisistratus' sons with a 
general reconciliation. An inscription dated from this time and 
found in Athena mentions Hippiaa as Archon in 526/5, Cleisthenes 
in 525/4, Miltiades in 524/3. 2 We do not know of any other 
Cleisthenes associated with Athenian politics at this time, and 
the name itself is not Athenian, hence rare. Archon Cleisthenes 
therefore must be the son of Megaoles, the Alcmeonid from Alopeke, 
who later carried on the reforms of the Athenian state (508/7).3 
The same course ia true about Miltiades, the Philaid. Thia, if 
true, and I accept it as true, destroys the old assumption that 
1 Ath. Pol. 17, l. 
2Thuc. I, 20,2 and VI, 54,2. B. D. Meritt, "Greek In-
scriptions, an Early Archon List," Hesperia, VIII (1939), 61-62. 
3The exact dates are points of dispute. They are shifted 
one year down or up. I am not interested in the exact dates here 
because they have no important bearing on the views expressed. 
13 
the Alcmeonids and the other political opponents of the Pisistra-
tids were in exile till the expulsion of Hippias. 1 It points to a 
possible advice for reconciliation with the families of his oppo-
nenta left by the mild-mannered Pisistratus to his young sons. 
This is not uncommon. People who have achieved their aim in life 
"by hook or by crook" become frequently sensitive about their 
image, or the lack of it, and they strive later to improve it The 
desire is natural and not always hypocritical. Many of the eco-
nomic tycoons of earlier days ended their lives as philanthropists. 
The Rockefellers, the Carnegies, the Vanderbilts, in the past cen-
tury are good illustrations of this mentality. In our own day 
Onassis is said to have married into the "jetset" to elevate his 
social prestige. 
Pisistratus, who had upset the established order, did his 
best to legitimize his position once he was in power. It should 
not seem therefore paradoxical if at his deathbed he enjoined his 
sons to make a fresh start by reconciling themselves with his 
former antagonists. Hippias was obviously wi1ling to make this 
new start because we see him at the outset of his administration 
granting the highest office in the city to his family's opponents. 
We do not know exactly what transpired in the period be-
tween 524 and 514 in Athens, except that the friendship between 
2 the two houses proved to be temporary. We find the Alcmeonids 
lll?i.Q.. 
2The Alcmeonids probably fled the city again after the 
murder of Hipparchus, although this is not certain. If so, it 
means that they had become estranged again, unless Cleisthenes 
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1 busy against Hippias during the fiasco of Leips7drion, which means 
that they were out of Athens again some time between 524-514. Per-
haps they were expelled because they were involved in the murder 
of Hipparchus. 2 
When the attempt to dislodge Hippias failed at Leipsydrion, 
the resourceful Alcmeonids turned to another source for support, 
Delphi.3 They intended to use the Delphic services and the Del-· 
phic connections with Sparta to pursue their goal. In 511 we find 
them at Delphi with Sparta as their ally attempting to drive Hip-
4 pias out. The Spartans were not necessarily motivated by a dis-
like of the Hippias regime, because theirs was not a democracy 
after all. They were probably moved by a desire to please the 
oracle; to ingratiate themselves with the Athenians; to break the 
Pisistratid ties with Argos, an immemorial enemy of the Spartans; 
to get out of their inactivity and stagnation; harkened to the ad-
vice of Cleomenes, their ambitious King who aspired to play a 
bigger role in the affairs of Greece.5 They finally came to the 
support of Cleisthenes. This was what Cleisthenes needed. The 
time seems to have been ripe for such an enterprise. 
The Greeks were alwa7s a curious people. They loved to 
have a sa1 in the public affairs of their city. After all this 
referred to here is another unknown to us, not from the Alemeonid 
family, which is a rather risky hypothesis. 
1Hdt V, 62,2. 2Meritt, op. cit., pp. 61-62. 
3adt v, 62,2-3. 
4Hdt V, 6 6 1 2- 3; 90-9 • Ath. Pol. 19. 
5Hdt V, 64,2. 
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is the sort of relationship that the idea of a city-state as exem-
plified by Athens represented. But the over-preoccupation and 
meddling in all the details and in all facets and at every step in 
the conduct of public affairs was recognized to be a deleterious 
habit by Pisistratus.1 He tried to channel off their energies 
from public affairs to more profitable activities because he de-
sired a free hand in the administration of the city. Disgusted as 
the Athenians were with the antics of the parties, Pisistratus• 
policy paid dividends. But by 510 conditions internally had 
changed and so had the political mood of the people. A new gener-
ation had grown up since the times of Pisistratus. The elderly 
probably did not find sons measuring up to their father. 2 Time 
had elevated the personality of Pisistratus in the minds of the 
Athenians to heights not easily attainable by the living. Com-
pared with their father, the sons were found lacking in political 
stature. The younger Athenians, as it always happens with younger 
people, were not to be easily satisfied with the status quo which 
had imposed upon them the sons of their father. Nor did they like 
things as they were. The sons were not as tactful as their father. 
Aristotle makes Thessalus, the third son of Pisistratus, 3 a head-
strong and violent man responsible for the ills of the Piaistra-
tids. Thucydides makes Hipparchus responsible for them.4 'Which-
1 ARh• Pol. 16,3. 
2Victor Ehrenberg, From Solon tg Socrates (London: Methuen 
and Co., Ltd., 1968), p. 84, claims that Hippias was a lesser man 
than his father. 
4 Thuc. VI, 54,2-4 and 56,1-3. 
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ever was the case, some ground for complaint existed. Thia aitua-
tion gave rise to a plot whose motive might have been primarily 
personal. The plot ended in the murder of Hipparchus. Thucydides 
says that the conspirators were few. 1 Aristotle. who had in mind 
Thucydides. says that they were many, probably taking into consid-
eration the moral support and approbation that the murderers tac-
itly received by the underground dissatisfaction that existed. 2 
The murder of Hipparchus must have numbed the people's sentiments 
for a while, because when Cleisthenes invaded Attica in 513 with 
a small force he received no wide popular support. 
The murder of Hipparchus however is important for its long 
range effects. It was bound to exacerbate affairs. The psycho-
logical pressure applied on Hippias was great. He became suspi-
cious and apprehensive and retorted with more violence. 3 The 
exiles among the higher classes must have multiplied, and it was 
with the help of these exiles th.at Cleisthenes managed to unseat 
l Thuc. VI, 56,3. 
2Atg., Pol. 18,~: I think that the numbers seen here by 
Aristotle have to do with the fact that Harmodius and Aristogeiton 
had in his time become martyrs. This is not unlike Lincoln's fate 
who was little respected when he lived but sanctified after his 
death. The glorification of the tyrannicides has very little 
bearing on the political realities of their time. 
_ 3Thuc. VI, 59,2-3. ~or, o'A_&DvgCoL, ~aA~no~£p,a µEla 
~ou~o ~ ~upavvC£ xa~fo~~ xgC b InnLa~ oLa ~o~ov DOD µaAAov 
&v ~~V ~~ noAL~WV noAAou, tK~ELVE xaL np6t ~& ~~W ~µa 
OLEOKOnE!To, Et n63EV &o,&AELaV ~Lv6 bp~D µETa~oAfi, YEVO-
µfvDt tndpxouoav ot. 'Inn6KAou yoDv Tou'Aaµ~aKDVOU ~up&v­
vou Alav~C6D T~ nfrLoC &uya~fea tau~oD µET~ TaDTa,'APXE-
oCKDv,'A&~varo, mv Aaµ~a-K~VW ~OWKEV, QLa&nv6µEVOt a~~OUt 
µ~ya ncpQ ~aOLAEL ~apEC~ ouv&o&a~. 
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Hipparchus in 510. The combination therefore of internal pres-
sures and the external aid achieved for Cleisthenes what he aimed 
at, the expulsion of his personal opponent. But it failed to 
bring him the political power that he expected. The nobles did 
not explicitly trust his family, and the people had no reason to 
1 
support him. After all, he too was an aristocrat assisted by 
and vying for aristocratic support. 2 
1The ancient sources agree that the tyrants were not that 
bad. The story of the idolization of Harmodius and Aristogeiton 
given by Herodotus (V, 66) is a later invention. Even Herodotus 
admits that the power of Athena during the administration of the 
Pisistratids was great (V, 66). See also Aristotle, Politics, 
13lla,15. 
2Hignett, OE• cit., P• 125. 
CHAPTER II 
THE ARISTOCRAT AS A DEMOCRAT 
The Alcmeonids did not immediatel1 attain their goal, the 
leadership of Athens.1 It seems that the Aristocrats, who had 
their grudges against the Alomeonid famil7, did not for once go 
to the opposite extreme of exchanging Bippias for the mischievous 
Alcmeonids. The7 groomed Isagoras for the supreme office. 2 Their 
choice was unfortunate for the party but fortunate for the state. 
The nobles could have forgotten their grievances against Cleis-
thenes• family if they really wanted to strike a balance. But 
the1 were in no mood for compromise. The1 elected Isagoras Archon 
in 5o8/7.3 Be understood the position as leader of a monolithic 
faction--but not the subtleties of politics and his position as a 
4 
state leader. He proceeded to fulfill the demands of his con-
stituents. He revised the citizens rolls,5 thus striking directl7 
1Robinson, op. cit., pp. 243-254. 
2 Hdt V, 66,2. Ath. Pol. 20,l and 21,1. 
31sagoras was one of the nobles that assisted in the ex-
pulsion of Hippias. He quarrelled with Cleisthenes after the ex-
pulsion and was elected with the help of the other nobles. The 
interval helped Cleisthenes in two wa7s. It provided time for 
thought during which his program matured, and it detached him 
from the deleterious association of his former allies, the nobles. 
Ehrenberg, op. cit., P• 86. 
4For the role of the nobles in Athenian politics during 
this time see C. A. Robinson, Jr., "Medizing Athenian Aristo-
crats," n>.t Qlassica~ World, XXXV (1941), 39-48. 
5uenry T. Wade-Gery, Essays on Greek History (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1958), p. 152. Author does not necessaril1 accept the 
story of new citizens introduced by Cleisthenes. He believes that 
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at the former paralioi, supporters of the Alcmeonids in previous 
years and along with the poorer classes the bulk of Pisistratian 
l 
supporters later. 
Isagoras• measures succeeded in. preparing the ground for 
Cleisthenes' rule. The extremism of his partisans and his meas-
ures drove the people in opposition, 2 and Cleisthenes who had 
time to observe was the man to profit from the intervening period 
of authority enjoyed by the nobles. Bis motives were personal. 
He had spearheaded the expulsion of Hippias from purely antagon-
istic aims, but he had not developed an inflexible political pro-
gram. He had formulated no rigid political philosophy. He steps 
in now to exploit the political disenchantment, by placing him-
self at the head of the people (npOO't'ct't'TI~ 't'OU o·~µou ), the 
former supporters of Pisistratus. Isagoras was expelled from of-
£ice the following year, and Cleisthenes took over the government 
of the city. Thus in a haphazard manner Cleisthenes achieved 
what the Spartan aid and the support of Delphi were not able to 
secure for him.3 The Athenians had stamped the reign of Pisistra-
tus with their seal of approval by expelling Megacles from power 
forty years before. Now they installed into power the son of the 
within the Phratry certain "better" families discriminate against 
others and Cleisthenes tried to abolish this discrimination by 
juxtaposing the demes next to the Phratries. 
1 Ath. Pol. 13,5. Plutarch, Solon, 29,30. Hignett, 2.E.• 
cit., PP• 111 112. 
-
2 Hdt V, 66,2. Hdt V, 69,2. Ath, Pol. 20,l. 
3Ath. Pol. 19,2 and 5. Hdt V, 62,2 and 3; 63,1 and 2. 
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exile. A full swing of the pendulum had been completed, both for 
the Alcmeonid family and the peoplel 
Isagoras bears his share of the responsibility for his 
fall because, while in power, he pla7ed blindly the game of the 
people who elected him. He could have needled them a little, 
that is, he could have tried to broaden the political support by 
containing the extremism of the nobles. Be could have attempted 
to revise downward the number of families to be stricken from the 
rolls. We have no indication that he did any of these. He could 
not please all but at least he should have tried to alienate as 
few as possible. The lessons of history should have been very 
fresh in his mind. Hippias' policy after the murder of Hippar-
chus had resulted in the flight of many individuals from Athens. 
These joined the ranks of the conspirators and finally proved to 
be Hippias' undoing. It was a potent argument. A better politi-
cian than Isagoras could have used this argument as a weapon to 
caution his followers. He ignored it, proving once more that 
people forget easily the lessons of the past. Isagoras and his 
friends by their foolish behavior in striking seven hundred fa.mi-
lies from the rolls of citizens added fuel to the fire that 
spread and devoured the~. 1 
1 Hdt V, 69,2; 70,1; 72,l and 2. Ath. Pol. 20. For bib-
liography on this highly debated period of the Cleisthenian Re-
forms see Hermann Bengston, Griechisgbe Gesghighte ("Handbuch der 
Altertumswisaenschaft, 11 4 aufl.; Mtinchen: c. H. Beck, 1969), PP• 
128-145 and 151-166. Bengston says that the reforms of Cleis-
thenes were a necessity. If this is true--and it seems from 
their durability to be true--then it is to the credit of Cleis-
thenes that he finally saw their need, whereas Isagoraa and his 
friends refused to recognize the hard facts of their times. 
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It is unnecessary to belabor the Cleisthenian reforms. A 
great deal has been written on the subject and every reform attrib-
uted to him has been questioned at one time or another. What is 
important to note at this point is that Cleisthenes followed in 
the footsteps of Solon. His legislation was the logical extension 
of the legislation of Solon implemented almost a hundred years 
earlier; it is also written in the same vein of compromise and 
mildness as Solon's. During the hundred years after the Solonian 
Constitution a great deal had occurred that made a general over-
haul of that constitution imperative. Cleisthenes democratized 
the regime in the spirit of moderation practiced by Solon. Solon 
had given the demos more powers but not all they wanted. On the 
other hand, he cautioned those in power to respect the rights of 
the people. 1 It seems that the claims of each of the parties were 
extravagant and impracticable. If Solon were to seek to please 
either one of them, the city would have found itself in a worse 
predicament than he had found it. 2 Isagoras failed exactly be-
cause he had failed to follow the middle course. His program left 
1'0.X, 1)-. 1.Plutarch, J,eiyes, XVIII, 4. 
~~µw y&p iowKa ~6aov Kp&~o,,~Boaov &napKEr, 
~Lµij, O~~ &~EA~V, OV~ lnopE~&µEVO' 
ot8 Elxov 6~vaµLv KaL XP~µaoLv ~oav &yD~oC, 
KaL ~o!a'l~pao&µnv µDOEV QELKt, ~XELV 
!a~DV 6'&µ~L~nAwv Kpa~tpo, a&Ko, aµ~O~EpOLOLV 
vLKav 6'oVK Etao' oV6£~tpoL, &oCKw~. 
2 Ath, Pol. 12. 
- - - Et yap ~3£AOV 
S ~or, lvav~CoLoLv ~v6avE ~6~£, 
at~L, 6' ~ ~OLOLV ~~~POL,, opaOaL • 
noAA~v !v &vop~v ~6' txDP~3D ndAL,. • • 
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no room for compromise. Cleisthenes, like Solon, a practical man, 
devised an instrument on the basis of which some compromise could 
be worked out, if onl1 the rival factions showed a trace of good 
will. Therein lay his weapon of success. It proved therefore 
more durable than Solon's and extremely modern. The unfortunate 
interval of Isagoras' archonship proved for Cleisthenes and the 
state a blessing in disguise. It made Cleisthenes more cautious. 
It gave him the time to watch and learn from other people's mis-
takes. 
His first and most important step was to break down the 
old tribal divisions, and from the ashes of the old to create new 
l 
ones. He did not do away with the tribes since they were some-
thing that the people were accustomed to for centuries. But he 
made them now serve the needs of the times. He established new 
tribal divisions, not corresponding to the old ones. His purpose 
was dual: to dilute the hypertrophied loyalty to the old tribes, 
and to enfranchise a number of new citizens, mostly resident 
aliens. 2 There would have been endless problems in introducing 
these new citizens into the old tribes which were organized into 
clans and families on the old aristocratic basis. Now they were 
easily included in the new tribes which had no such associations 
connected with them.3 
1Hdt V, 69,2. AkQ• P9l. 21,2. Also C. W. J. Eliot, 
"Coastal Demes of Attika: A Study of the Policy of Kleisthenes," 
fhotnix, Suppl. V (Toronto: University o! Toronto Press, 1962), 
P• 9. 
2For bibliography and comments on this subject see Donald 
Karn, "The Enfranchisement of Aliens by Cleisthenes," Biet9r~,e., 
XI (1963), 41--46. Aristotle, Politigp, l275b.36. 
3:For a brief discussion on·the significance of this re-
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If the reforms did not please everyone, they failed at 
least to arouse strong animosities to the point that the opposi-
tion would react violently against Cleisthenes. Their future was 
thus secured. The four tribes became ten. Membership in the 
1 phratries was, however, retained for social reasons. Cleisthen-
es made the role of the council probuleutic and gave it control 
or the Agenda, thereby providing another check against abuses by 
the Sft•os. In so doing he still retained many of the privileges 
of the Areopagus, to which he belonged, providing an additional 
check against precipitous change. As a result these measures 
eliminated the would be and explainable opposition of the aristo-
crats. The aristocrats could still enjoy their social and polit-
ical preeminence within the phratries. 
Cleisthenes broke with the old principle that made atten-
2 dance in the assembly dependent on the ownership of land. It 
was a democratic measure fulfilling the demands of the expanding 
merchant class so vital to the development of Athens. Those who 
now wanted to venture out in commercial enterprise did not have 
to own land. Finally, the newly enfranchized citizens, descend-
form see Hignett, op. cit., pp. 156-157. The time of this reform 
is also questioned. Was the bill passed while Isagoras was still 
in power as Aristotle seems to indicate (Ath. Pol. 12,l) or in 
the following year? Herodotus who speaks about the tribal divi-
sion does not say anything on the matter (Hdt v, 69,2). 
1Hignett, op. cit., P• 145. Aischines, rr.Ep C 'tfk rr.o:.pa-
1tpEcr!3c: Co.~ t il?1sl•t P• 147. 
2 !!!!!•t P• 134. At least as much could be surmised from 
Ath. Pol. 21,6 and from the fact that metics could not own land. 
ants or the old met,gs or perhaps metig§ themselves did not neces-
sarily own land. Prior to Cleisthenes they were excluded !rom 
voting in the assembly. But in actuality the new change was not 
so radical as it might appear at !irst hand. Aristotle says that 
the government of a Greek city was usuallyconditioaed by the char-
acter of its principal military force, and the main strength if 
Athens still lay in its hoplites.1 The democracy of Cleisthenes 
still rested with the body of Athenian hoplites. Most of these 
lived in the countryside of Attica. Their preponderance in the 
assembly was still safeguarded and that made the acceptance of 
the Cleisthenian reform easier. That the legislation of Cleis-
then es found sa tisfactoey acceptance among these hopli tea is to be 
inferred by the fact that when later Isagoras tried to remove 
Cleisthenes from office with the aid of Cleomenes, Isagoras was 
thwarted by the adverse reaction of the people led by the coun-
2 cil. Such widespread acceptance had Cleisthenes already found. 
Among the laws of Cleisthenes was the law concerning 
ostracism.3 Plutarch explains ostracism in these terms, 11 The 
1Aristotle, P9liiios, l32la,5-l4. 
2For details on the incident see Hdt V, 70-73. What is 
meant by council is not clear. See Hignett, OE• cit., p. 128. 
Walker, ~' IV, 140-1. R. J. Bonner and G. Smith, Tpe A<iminis-
trati9n of Jµstipe from Bomer to Arie~ot•e (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1930-,38), I, 131. Ehrenberg, OE· cit., p. 66 
believes that the council that resisted Cleomenes was the Areopa-
gus. G. Desanctis, Atthis (2d ed.; Torino, 1952), p. 329. 
K. J. Beloch, Griegiji§gpe Geschicht9 (2 aufl.; Berlin: Gruyter, 
1927, 12, 399. P. Cloche, "La boule d 1 Athenes," Bgvue des 
Etudes Grecque, XXXVII (1924), 1-26. 
3There is no unanimity on this as is true of practically 
all of Cleisthenes' legislation. Bignet believes that ostracism 
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method of procedures--to give a general outline--was as follows. 
is not Cleisthenic in origin. His basis for his argument is that 
the Atthidographers do not agree on that. For a discussion of the 
sources and the confusion arising from them see Hignett, op. cit., 
pp. 159-173· He agrees that at its best a conclusion must be con-
jectured. Beloch also thinks that the law must have been a later 
invention because, if it existed, it would have been used earlier 
than the 480 1 s, a not too safe conclusion. Beloch, op. cit., p. 
332. Aristotle who attributes the law to Cleisthenes is very con-
fused on the chronology especially connected with the oath of the 
council (Att, f9l. 22). If correct the event would have taken 
place in 50 B.c. (Ata, P2•· 22). But that year belongs to an-
other Archon and not to Hermocreon whom he mentions. Secondly, it 
is inconsistent with his statement below that the Battle of Mara-
thon occurred eleven years later (Ath, Pol. 22). Francis R. B. 
Godolphin (ed.), Greek Histor:f..aps (New York: Random House, 1942), 
II, 694, ftn. 31. Marathon took place in 490 therefore the Ar-
chonship of Hermocreon should be assigned to 501 B.C. for which 
no name occurs in the extant lists of Archons. Donald Kagan, 11 The 
Origin and Purposes of Ostracism," HesEeria, XXX (1961), 39l-4ol, 
finds it surprising that the originator of ostracism would be 
doubted, though he has been mentioned by four ancient authors as 
being Cleisthen ·::s ({\th, Pol. 1-4; Aelian, Hist, Var., XIII, 24; 
Philocborus, FGrJU,st, ed. Felix Jacoby (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1950-
1958), fr. 30; Ephorus in Diodorus, XI, 55). He accepts the ex-
pression to mean at that time and not that year (the year 488), 
He concludes that from Androtion's perspective, who wrote 150 
years later~o~E may as well be 20 years. A. E. Raubitschek, in 
his 11 The Origin of Ostracism," American Journal of Archaeology, 
LV (1951), 221-229, has proposed that the law of ostracism was 
passed by Cleisthenes later than his other legislation when Cleis-
thenes came temporarily out of retirement. C. A, Robinson, Jr., 
"Cleisthenes and Ostracism," AJA, LVI (1952), 23-26, rejects 
Raubitsohek's view. Kagan mentions at least two other traditions 
attributing ostracism to Hippias and Theseus. The first reference 
he finds in Herakleides of Pontos (Fr. 6-? in c. and T. Mfiller 
(eds.), Fra en ta Historicorum Graecarum (Paris, 1841--70), II, 
208, discusee y • arcop o, ' a A (2d ed.; 
Paris: F. Alcan, 1935), pp. 7-10. See Kagan, "The Origin and 
Purposes of Ostracism," ot. cit,, p. 398. Ibi,Sl., ftJ'l.. 17.) 
"A'AA.or, 6£ E:o'tCv"Immpx.6 ts ::X:a:pµov, w~ <jHjOL AtJKO'Upyo~ 
tv ~w Ka:~a AEw~pa~ou~ nEpC 6£ 'tou'tov 'Avopo'tCwv lv ~fi ~Cq>qOLV rni. ovyy£v1j~ µ£v Tiv ll£LOLO'tpa'tO'U 'tOU 
'tvpdvvou KaC npra'to~ !~wa'tpa:KCo&n, ~o~ nEpC ~6v 6o~pa:­
KLcµov voµo'U 't6't£ npw~ov ~£&£v'to~ OLO: ~tiv Dno~Cav 
't~V nEpC IlELOLO'tpa~oU 5'tL y6~ ~'t'UpaVVEUOEV. 
(FGrHist, 324,16). Thia view was accepted by Aristotle who fol-
lowed Androtion (Kagan, "The Origin and Purposes of Ostracism," 
op. cit., p. 395). Also K. J. Dover, 11Androtion on Ostracism," 
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Each voter took an ostrakon or potsherd, wrote on it the name of 
1 that citizen whom he wished to remove from the city." J. Carco-
pino has proposed an attractive solution to the problem of ostra-
cism. He sees in it a modification of the severity of earlier 
legislation, which prescribed that if anyone tried to make him-
self tyrant or helped another to do so, "he and his descendant 
will be atimoi. 112 "A't°t.µo!; in the sixth century meant that he 
could be killed with impunity.3 
There might have been talk of eliminating some of the 
surviving relatives of Hippias. Reform is a sleeping monster and 
so are people in areas where emotions predominate. In this cli-
mate people are quick to be aroused and easy to forget, especial-
ly when they believe they have a righteous cause to be aroused or 
• 
a good excuse to forget. Not only did Cleisthenes seem to have 
satisfied many of their grievances, but Hippias himself had run 
off to the Hellespont where he worked for his return to Athens 
with the military aid of the Persian court. The net result of 
this would be either to make Athens a satellite of the Persian 
Classical Beyiew, XIII (1963), 256-257. He believes that for many 
years the influential men at Athens succeeded, each in his own 
actual or imagined interest, in dissuading the assembly from hold-
ing an ostracism, so that the first ostracism was the product of 
an unsure unity and intensity of purpose. 
1Plutarch, Aristidgs ("Loeb Classical Library"; Cambridge: 
Harvard University Preas, 1959), VII, 4. 
to note that no one was ever killed 
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empire or subordinate Athens completely to Persia.1 This was 
therefore enough to make the Athenians indignant and forgetful of 
the former services of the Pisistratids. In this atmosphere, it 
is understandable that a resolution in the ecclesia against the 
surviving members of this family might have been proposed, or if 
proposed had a good chance of being voted upon. Yet I would like 
to suggest here that such a motion was not made. Cleisthenes, 
once in power, had nothing to gain by such an extremist attitude. 
On the contrar1, he stood a lot to lose. Aristotle says that the 
law of ostracism was enacted by Cleiathenes with a specific per-
2 
son in mind, Hipparchus, the son of Charmus, a nephew of Hippiaa. 
Yet Hipparchus, despite the intentions of Cleisthenes, was not 
exiled until 487, almost twenty years after the law on ostracism 
was enacted. If, as Aristotle says, the law was passed to ostra-
cize Hippias, it seems strange that the people would pass Cleis-
thenes 1 law, but then they would turn around and deny Cleisthenes 
the validity of his law by not allowing him to ostracise Bippar-
chus. The enactment of the law indicates that Cleisthenes was 
still at the height of his popularity. Had he wished, he could 
have easil~ accomplished his goal to ostracize Hipparchus. Never-
theless, there is another way out. The other alternative would be 
that between the time the law on ostracism was passed and the ape-
cific proposal for the banishment of Hipparchus was made the popu-
1 Hdt V, 66,3; 91,l and 2; 94,1-2; 96. McGregor, ot. cit., 
p. 73, ftn. 6, gives details of Hippias' movements during Is 
exile. 
2A~h. Pol. 22,4. See also c. w. Fornara, "A Note on 
Atheneon Politeia 22," Classical Qu.arterly, XIII (1963), 101-102. 
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larity of Cleisthenea had waned, and the proposal had lost steam 
while the law of ostracism remained. This might be denoted by 
the following statement of Aristotle1 that the Athenians, with 
the usual leniencz of the democracz, 2 allowed all the partisans 
of the tyrants who had not joined in their evil deed in the time 
of the troubles to remain in the city, a curious statement in it-
self not because Aristotle himself almost fell victim to this 
type of "leniency" but also because it is not congruent with the 
realities. The truth is that the Athenian dS!JloP was not lenient 
to its political leaders.3 The secret must lie therefore in 
something else. I propose that the truth lies in Cleisthenes' 
other considerations. I also believe that Cleisthenes might not 
have taken the success of his law on ostracism very seriously. 
Finally, I suggest that ostracism produced the iron1 of strength-
ening the tendency toward tyranny rather than lessening its dan-
ger. I will try to be more specific. Cleistbenes himself a 
moderate man and a victim of expulsion along with his family did 
not wish to condemn an innocent man to exile. For that reason, 
even though he steered the law through the assembly, re refused 
to implement it in the case of Hipparchus. He left it there as 
a Damoclean sword hanging over the head of the would-be-tyrants 
--or so at least he might have thought. 4 Thus the old v6µo~ tnC 
l Ath, Pol. 22. 2 A$h• Pp~. 22,4. Italics mine. 
3This is an axiom that needs no examples. The people dis-
cussed in this paper are only a small example of the fate of Greek 
political leaders. 
4 George w. Botsford, 11The Development of the Athenian Con-
stitution," Cornell Studies of Classical Philolop (New York: Ginn 
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ytvEL (law against the whole family) which resembles the Ancient 
Near Eastern custom of the whole family's association in the crime 
of one of its members was replaced by a more civilized and humane 
law ~D~Cvµa~a ~n' &vopC •• (a bill against a man). 1 
There is also another reason why ostracism would not be as 
effective a preventive measure as it looked on paper. The person 
who aspired to offset the constitution would certainly act in a 
conspiratorial manner. If his coup succeeded, he would not have 
to worry because he was the supreme law of the land. But if he 
failed, he very well knew that his actions would have provoked the 
wrath of his fellow-citizens, and his flight was a natural con-
comitant. Ostracism was thus superfluous in this occasion. 
Outside of the above reason Cleisthenes had a more practi-
cal reason why he did not wish to fan the flames of Greek politi-
cal passions for party or personal grounds. First, such a move 
would not have helped his reform program, which needed time to 
and Co., 1893), IV, 204. According to Botsford ostracism was de 
vised for the protection of the constitution against the friends 
of the tyrants whose leader was Hipparchus, son of Charmus, kins-
man of the Pisistratids. Cleisthenes' iDIDlediate object in intro-
ducing ostracism was to expel this man because of his dangerous 
enmity to the government. He accepts Aristotle's views that the 
demos was lenient. The truth is, however, that no open act of 
hostility on his part occurred which would warrant the applica-
tion of the measure. Then the danger of 490 awakened them. Still 
no action was taken until two years later, when they learned that 
a new invasion was being meditated. To secure their rear they 
acted. 
1
carcopino, op. cit., pp. 35-36. Hignett, OE· cit., P• 
162, does not agree with Carcopino's statement. He simpiy feels 
that Hipparchus was not banished because he was not a direct 
descendant of Pisistratus. Ehrenberg, of. cit., p. 87 says that 
ostracism, its rational clarity, moderat on, etc., fits well into 
the general picture of Cleisthenes' statesmanship. 
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strike roots. Secondly, it had to do with Cleisthenes' attitude 
toward Persia. This brings us to another problem that has also 
stirred the curiosity of historians and for which there is little 
information in the ancient sources. This is the question of Per-
sia at this time. I have already mentioned that one of the 
grudges of some of Hippias' former supporters against him might 
have been his collaboration with Persia. 
M. F. McGregor, in his article under the title 11The Pro-
Persian Party at Athens from 510-480,"1 contends first that the 
Alcmeontids were hostile to the tyrants, and so they must be 
called anti-Persian, especially after the flight of Hippias to 
Persia. The second point is that they were anti-Spartan because 
of the policy of Cleomenes toward the Cleisthenian constitution. 
Third, the aristocrats who were friends of Isagoras and Sparta 
were also anti-Persian after 510 because Sparta herself was anti-
Persian. Therefore, he concludes, no strong pro-Persian party 
existed at Athens after 510. When Persia threatened Greece in 
490-480 domestic quarrels were put aside by all in favor of a 
2 
unified foreign policy. Those who could be pro-Persian were the 
commons, former followers of the Pisistratids. But the commons 
had gone over to Cleisthenes and later on to Themistocles who was 
l McGregor, o~. cit., pp. 93-96. For different views see 
w_, IV, 168. Also. A. Robinson, Jr., "The Struggle for Power 
at Athens in the Early Fifth Century,!! ~, LX (1939), 232-237· 
2It is an ingenious argument which shows what can be done 
even with the meager information that we possess if one has a 
good mind. It is an argument needless to say that has not found 
general acceptance. 
31 
definitely anti-Persian.1 He disagrees with the logical point of 
2 c. A. Robinson, Jr. who thinks that some nobles who hated the re-
forms of Cleisthenes could side with Hippias now. He therefore 
does not accept as true the embassy of Athens to Persia as report-
ed by Herodotus.3 Herodotus himself is not very clear on this 
point, and his lack of clarity has been correctly interpreted, I 
believe, as an effort on his part to conceal the role of Cleis-
thenes in this affair. Herodotus reports that after the second 
police action of Cleomenes, which resulted in the disgraceful re-
tirement of Cleomenes, and the return of Cleisthenes to Athens 
along with the seven hundred families exiled previously by Isa-
goras, the Athenians dispatched envoys to Sardis to make an alli-
ance with Persia because they were sure that the Spartans would 
return. The ambassadors reached Sardis and delivered the message 
to Artaphernes. Artaphernes demanded earth and water in exchange 
for the alliance. The envoys, after consulting together, anxious 
as they were to form an alliance, accepted the terms, but on their 
4 
return to Athens, they fell into deep disgrace. Herodotus does 
1McGregor, op. cit., P• 93. 
2Robinson, "The Struggle for Power in Athens ••• ," 2E.:. 
£!!., PP• 232-233· 
3 Hdt V, 73. 
4
Hdt v, 73·'A&Dva!oL ot µ£~a ~au~a KA£La&tvEa KaC 
, ~ , l. , , 5'. (l , J. , , ~a n~aKOOLa ~RLO~La ~a vLWXv£V~a vno KA£oµ£vEo' µE~a-
n£µ~&µ£VOL n~µnoUOL ayylAou~ £l~ ~apoL,, auµµaxCDV 
PouA6µ£VOL,nOL~aaa&aL np6~ ntpaa, ~nLa~ta~o ydp a~CaL 
AaK£OaLµOVLou, ~E KaC KA£oµfv£a tKn£noA£µ~o&aL. 
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not spell out what the role of Cleisthenes was in this muddy af-
fair. He mentions the "Athenians" but does not say under whose 
influence and suggestion. Yet he does not fail to note that the 
event happened right after the return of Cleisthenes.1 At this 
point Cleisthenes was a popular hero and it is doubtful that the 
Athenians would have acted contrary to his advice. It was proba-
bly at this suggestion that they sent the embassy. It is also 
probable that the zealous envoys exceeded their instructions and 
this brought disgrace on them directly as well as on the origina-
tor or the supporter of the proposal indirectly. After this, we 
do not know what happened to the political fortunes of Cleis-
thenes. We hear about him no more. 2 
I mentioned before that the story of Herodotus has been 
doubted. Yet we know that Herodotus was a partisan of the Ale-
meonid family, and that he would have omitted the story if he had 
not found some historicity for it. Again, if he thought that the 
story was a gossip--and the Athenians, like the rest of the Greeks 
were very prone to political gossip- he would have said so, as he 
did in the ease of the shield after the Battle of Marathon. 3 From 
the above, it becomes, I believe, rather evident that Cleisthenes 
was in some form or another associated with the proposal to form 
4 
an embassy to Persia. What were his motives for supporting such 
1Hdt V, 73,1. 
2A. W. Gomme, 11Athenian Notes,q .A..IPj., LXV (1944), 321-
339, sees nothing improbable about an embassy sent by Cleisthenes. 
3Hdt VI, 115; 121,l; 123-124. 
4Walker ~' IV, 157-158, claims that the embassy to Per-
sia described by Herodotus was sent by Cleisthenes who was well 
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a proposal? One reason is already given by Herodotus: the danger 
of another Spartaninvasion. It stands to reason that Cleomenes 
would not let the humiliation he suffered at the hands of the 
Athenians pass with impunity. After all, it seems that the whole 
Spartan embroilment in the Athenian affairs at this time was his 
project.1 In such a case Cleisthenes needed support from without. 
He could have applied to Persia for aid in order to contain the 
Spartan danger. The extravagant Persian demands and the docility 
of the Athenian envoys wrecked Cleisthenes' policy and his politi-
cal future. An additional reason for the embassy could have been 
the desire of Cleisthenes to anticipate and frustrate the plans 
of Hippias and those who, after the Spartan force had retreated, 
might have been inclined to machinate with Hippias and Persia in 
order to succeed where the Spartans had failed. If such were the 
case we will never know, but again the plan was destroyed for the 
same reasons. At this point the Persians acted in the least dip-
loma tic manner. It was an excellent opportunity for the Imperial 
Court to place a wedge in Greece, and to nip the Athenian partici-
pation in the Ionian revolt long before the revolt started. By 
2 demanding such Punic terms, the Persians forfeited a unique chance. 
aware what the Persian court 
it, and that Herodotus tries 
envoys. 
uNlVERSITY 
2Herodotus does not say if the embassy wa disavowed be-
fore Cleomenes' efforts toward revenge were thwart b~~~~ 
thians and Demaratos, or after. If after, then the drilill'l~l'l'!niCi°e 
of the danger might have played an important role in the 
change of attitude. 
That the Athenians therefore did not dare use the law of 
ostracism until their victory at Marathon gave them confidence is, 
1 
as Bignett suggests, inconsistent with the above events. Aside 
from Cleisthenes' moderation with regard to the use of ostracism 
this policy toward Persia might have been a determinant in his 
caution. 
So far we have accepted with reservations the version of 
Aristotle that ostracism was invented by Cleisthenee as a weapon 
to sca~e the would-be tyrants. A closer evaluation at this point 
is necessary. It was a curious device as Grote calls it. 2 It 
took place once a year, if the assembly so decided. A quorum of 
six thousand was needed. The man who received the greatest num-
ber of votes was to be exiled for ten years. At the end of his 
ten-year term he could return with full possession of rights. The 
exile did not carry with it the confiscation of his property. No 
doubt, Cleisthenes knew the Greeks well enough to know that some 
one could very well be tempted to try tyranny again.3 It would 
be naive, however, to believe that someone could be prevented 
1Bignett, op. cit., pp. 179-180. 
2George Grote, Bisto57 of Greece (New York: Collier and 
Son, 1900), IV, 155-161. 
3Hignett, OE· cit., p. 186, unlike Aristotle (Politics 
l284a,15; 1284b,15; 1302b,15), thinks that ostracism was invented 
and used from the start as a party weapon by the anti-Persian 
leaders, but the end which they had in view, the salvation of 
Athens and of Greece, was patriotic and to that end the banish-
ment of their political rivals was a necessary preliminary. He 
attributes the ostracism to Themistocles (Bignett, op.cit., P• 
188) who also made the Archons subject to lot and brought about 
the election of Strategoi without limitation in years of service. 
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from attempting to become a tyrant by the law of ostracism.1 
There is also an irony involved here. A man could not be exiled 
unless voted upon by the ecclesia. The irony here is that the 
ecclesia would exile a would-be "tyrant" at the suggestion or the 
political leader who was uppermost in the ecclesia at that par-
ticular period of time. In other words, the people would accept 
the proposal of the most influential of its leaders against his 
opponent who happened to be the underdog. The ostracism of 
Xanthippus, Megacles, and Aristides, to limit outselves to the 
period under discussion, are flagrant examples of the fact that 
they were ostracized because the opposition proved itself strong-
er by managing to mobilize the vote against them. The occasion 
of their ostracism denotes that they had fallen in disfavor; 
hence they could not be strong enough to constitute a danger to 
Democracy. The spirit of the law of ostracism did not apply to 
them at the time they were ostracized. Thus, a possible checking 
force was eliminated, and the politician who spearheaded the os-
tracism was left even stronger than he was before his opponent's 
banishment. Who then was the potential tyrant? There are other 
2 incongruities here also. 
1In our times the violation of the constitutional order 
is supposed to be severely punishable in Greece; yet there have 
been many cases--including the present--in which the violators 
were not stopped by the fear of punishment. 
2Aristotle, Po••tics, 128l+a,15-19 speaks about ostracism 
and its intention by the legislator to equalize power. While he 
deplores the fact that ostracism deteriorated to a weapon used 
for purely factional purposes and also for the elimination of the 
distinguished members of the state C1284b,23), he fails to say 
that ostracism produced also the opposite effects, for a vhile at 
The Greeks loved politics. It was their passion, and they 
carried it on with all seriousness. They have managed to survive 
in history, despite the passionate way with which they have in-
dulged in the political games, or perhaps because of it. It has 
been a thankless task to engage in Greek politics. It brings 
nothing but bitterness, vituperation, and grief even to the beat 
of the political leaders. The Greeks have been more fanatic and 
petty in their passion for politics than any other civilized na-
tion in history with the exception perhaps of the Jews. Both 
peoples have survived in history whereas other great nations of 
antiquity have forever perished. 
The Greeks rival the Jews in being the most politically minded 
race in the world. No matter how forlorn their circumstance 
or how grave the peril to their country, they are always divid-
ed into many parties, with many leaders who fight among them-
selves with desperate vigor. It has been well said that wher-
ever there are three Jews it will be found that there are two 
Prime Ministers and one leader of the Opposition. The same is 
true of this other famous ancient race, whose stormy and end-
less struggle for life stretches back to the fountain springs 
of human thought. No other two races have set such a mark 
upon the world• Both have shown a capacity tor survival, in 
spite of unending perils and sufferings from external oppres-
sors, matched only by their own ceaseless feuds, quarrels, and 
convulsions. ~e passage of several thousand iears sees no 
change in their characteristics and no diminution of their 
trials or their vitalitz. They have survived in spite of all 
that the world could do against them, and all they could do 
against themselves, and each of them from angles so different 
has left us the inheritance of its genius and wisdom.l 
Despite these setbacks most of the Greeks have been little politi-
least, it left the leader who rallied the people behind the ostra-
cism of his opponent stronger than he was before, and that was not 
intended by the originator of ostracism (Aristotle, Politics, 
1}02b). 
1 Winston s. Churchill, iae Second World War (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1951), V, 532. Italics mine. 
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cians. In their lifetime they all believe they possess ideas for 
the solution of their state's maladies, if only they were given a 
chance to enforce them! They never suspected for once that their 
excessive preoccupation with politics and their constant and un-
called-for ~eddling in it might have been responsible for some of 
the maladies. 1 They chose a leader and immediately they proceed-
ed to dictate to that leader what to do and how. Yet, in spite 
of this odd political behavior, there has been no lack of politi-
cal leaders. To strike against the political opponent by ostra-
cizing him, as the whole thing deteriorated later, meant perhaps 
eliminating one of the opponents, but not the opposition. For 
each head that was cut off many new ones sprang up. 2 The power 
vacuum created by the forceful withdrawal of a political personal-
ity was filled immediately by others who stepped into the picture. 
Besides, the measure itself pushed the opposition to extremes. So 
much so that it would stop at nothing until the passion for re-
venge was satisfied. The opposition would have no scruples about 
engaging in legal or illegal methods against the establishment. 
Thus even the constitution itself suffered. The answer to the 
extreme which resulted in the ostracism or Cimon was the assassi .. 
nation of Ephialtes.3 
1Ath, Pol. 16,2-3. Pisistratus saw this fanatic preoccu-
pation with politics as injurious and tried to keep the people 
busy with other things. 
2The rash of ostracisms in the 480's exemplifies my point. 
See my fourth chapter. 
3Hignett, op. cit., p. 197. Ath. Pol. 25,4. Diodorus 
Siculus, XI, 77,6. 
For another thing, prosecutors with personal motives could 
take advantage of ostracism as well as those who were in reality 
1 public-spirited citizens. As a matter of fact, it does not take 
one long to convince himself that he is acting in public spirit, 
while in reality he is unable to draw the line between personal 
grudges and public justice. Finally, the Athenian citizens acted 
as a court of justice in the occasions of ostracism, and they were 
not necessarily the most objective and just judges. The incident 
of Aristides comes to mind here, as quoted in Plutarch, which may 
not be a true event but it was true to the character of the Athe-
2 
nian assembly man. Later on we find many authors complaining 
about the easiness and the superficiality with which the Athenians 
decided on many cases. The occasion of the ten strategoi after 
the naval battle of Argynousae is a glaring example. Plato jus-
tifiably complains in the Apology that the real issue of Socra-
tes' trial was mostly drowned in a load of irrelevancies, purpose-
ly introduced to divert attention and becloud the issues as well 
as the mind of the jurors.3 The plaintiff in Apollodorus v. 
Stephanus related how on one occasion the jurors were so inflamed 
against him by his opponent's speech, that they drove him from 
4 the court without listening to him. The example could be multi-
plied.5 
1Aristophanes, Plutus, 900. 
2For details on this incident see Plutarch, Aristides, VII. 
3Apologz, 2aa. 4Demosthenes 45,6. 
5P1ato, ~' 876B; Gorgias, 515E; Ath. Pol. 27,3. 
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The abuses of ostracism would show later in the decade of 
the 48o•s, when the old generation would fade away and a new crop 
of young, ambitious politicians would fight over the issues of 
the day for control of the assembly and the dominance of their 
ideas. For the time being ostracism as a political practice lay 
dormant. This was due to the moderating presence of Cleiethenes, 
the wounds of recent troubles, the absorption of the Athenians 
with the reforms, the imminence of Cleomenes1 and above all the 
Persian danger. All these factors contributed to a period of 
good feelings during which ostracism was not practiced. 
1 Hdt V, 90, 91, 96, 97. 
CHAPTER III 
DOVES AND HAWKS 
Mention of the Persian danger brings us to our next con-
sideration of the period prior to Marathon and the external as 
well as internal problems encountered by the city of Athens. Un-
fortunately, our two main guides on this period, Aristotle and 
Herodotus, are very uninformative in this sequence of domestic 
events. Herodotus especially who has expatiated on some of the 
ramifications of the Ionian revolt and the attitudes of its lead-
ere provides us with information which we would gladly have ex-
changed for a more cogent description of the internal state of 
Athens, the personalities, and the political configuration there-
in. Cleisthenes is not mentioned in connection with the events. 
If he still lived at this time, he was probably old and retired 
from politics. 
Among the propelling forces of the Ionian revolt were the 
Milesians Histiaeus and Aristagoras.1 If we are to believe Hero-
dotus their motives were mainly personal and their role ill-
1J. A. s. Evans, "Histiaeus and Aristagoras: Notes on the 
Ionian Revolt," &!fA, LXXXIV (1963), 113-128. A more recent 
article by Mabel Lang discusses the role of Histiaeus and Arista-
goras in the revolt. She blames Herodotus tor his malevolence 
toward the two leaders. She concludes with the statement that 
the revolutionary movement was defeated leas by Persian valor and 
the ambition of its leaders than by a failure of steadfastness 
and cooperation on the part of the Ionian&. M. Lang, "Herodotus 
and the Ionian Revolt," Historia, XVII (1968), 24-,36. Also A. 
Blamire, "Herodotus and Histiaeus," £i, IX (1959), 142-154. 
Beloch, op. cit., IIl, 5,8. Bengtson, op. cit., PP• 151-161. 
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adviaed.1 Aristagoras tried to solicit Sparta's help first since 
the Spartans had already established a reputation of gallantry. 
Cleomenes was still the person to reckon with in Sparta. 2 But 
the ruling circles in Sparta had a lot to sa7, no doubt, on a 
question of such major importance. 
Aristagoras came to Sparta one hundred years earlier. 
The Spartan turtle was Peloponnese-oriented and it had no inten-
tion of moving out of its Peloponnesian shell. The Spartans had 
hesitated to follow the ambitious policy of Cleomenes just a lit-
tle while before in connection with Athens; would they venture to 
adventures across the sea? Besides, since the7 too must have 
held the Persian colossus in awe, would not it be reckless to em-
bark on an enterprise that was bound to activate the Persian 
dinosaur against them? One ma1 call it a provincial policy, but 
at least the Spartan polic1 was the residue of a realistic evalu-
ation of the international and internal exigencies of the time. 
fhe1 politely said "no than.ks'' and dismissed Aristagoras. Aris-
tagoras did not give up. If he could not get the best, he was 
willing to settle for the second best. After the Spartan cold-
shower he went to Athens. fhere he mixed myths with realities 
in order to arouse the Athenians. He told them what bad warriors 
the Persian soldiers were, how they used "neither shield nor 
1 Hdt V, 96-126. 
2 Lang, oi• cit., P• 36, doubts that Aristagoras ever 
solicited Cleomenesl help. 
spear," and "how easy to conquer" they were. 1 Then he reminded 
them or their common bonds with the Ionians and that Kiletus was 
their colony. 2 There is no doubt that the Athenians had reasons 
to be displeased with the Persians. The Persians had enslaved 
the Ionian Greeks; they had extended their sway over the Belle-
spont, this vital zone for Athens• commercial activities and corn 
supplies; they had rejected their earlier efforts at some kind of 
mo~us xixtndi (c. 505); they were lending an ear to Hippias• 
machinations, and they had rejected the second Athenian overture 
at reconciliation with the imperious and callous demand that they 
accept back Bippias, as the prerequisite of any alliance with the 
Persians.3 Herodotus does not say it but the Athenians must have 
been deeply divided over foreign policy, and the coming of Arista-
goras opened up the wounds. The Athenians abandoned the Ionians 
in the middle of the fighting which means that the Athenians 
changed their policy toward the Ionians in mid-stream. One is 
led to conclude that their original decision to support the Ioni-
ans did not enjoy the unanimous approval of the ecclesia.4 The 
decision to dispatch an expeditionar7 force of twenty ships was 
probabl7 the crystallization of an animated discussion in the 
assembly and a compromise among the various views. Aristagoras, 
l Hdt V, 97,1-2. 
'En;c::A.-Owv ot. bi C ,;6v oYjµov 6 'Ap 1.0-rayopTJ~ -raD,;Q 
!A.EYE 't~ KaC tv i;ij Ln&p'tTJ nc::pC 't~V &ya-O~v 
i;~v tv i;~ ~oCn KaC ,;uU noAlµou i;oU nc::pcri.KoU, 
~~ O~'t£ aonCoa O~'tE o6pv voµCCovoi. EVnc::-rtc::~ 
~E XEl.p~-Oijvai. c::tnoav. 
2 Hdt V, 97,2. 3iidt v, 96,1-2. 4 Hdt V, 10,3. 
as Herodotus sa7s, "at last prevailed and won them over," and 
then he adds with a touch of irony the dictum that he had formu-
lated from personal observations during his stay in Athens, that 
sometimes it is "easier to deceive a multitude than one man. 111 
2 This statement seems to indicate the struggle in the assembly 
and the fact that the decision of democracy, regardless of the 
off-shoot of the Persian Wars--something that one could not pos-
sibly predict before 490--was precipitous, ill-advised, thought-
less, irrational, and perilous in the context of the internation-
al situation in 499. 
It is evident that in about 500 there were at least two 
trends in Athens: one urging rapprochement with the Persians; 
the other, to put it mildly, was lukewarm to the idea. The di-
verging trends in the ecclesia are to be seen from what preceded 
Aristagoras' arrival. The question of foreign policy had come 
up for discussion in the ecclesia.3 The Athenian demos decided 
l Hdt V, 9?,2. 
ITOAAO~~ yap ot~E E!va~ EVnE~tcr~EpOV o~a~aAAE~V 
Yi ~va, Et KA£oµtvEa µtv ~6v AaxEoa~µ6vLov 
µoUvov out 016, ~£ tytvE~O 6La~&AAELV, ~pEC, 
of µupLao&, A&nvaCwv tnoCnoE ~ou~o. 
2Walker, Q.Ai, IV, 137-139, 168 contends that there was a 
pro-Pisistratean party during the Persians Wars committed to the 
to ~.1e return of Hippias and that the Pisistra tids and Alcmeonids 
had formed an alliance against aid to Ionia. Robinson disagrees 
because he thinks that this would mean the end of the Alcmeonids 
since Hippias and the Alcmeonids hated one another. On~ some 
nobles could be pro-Persian who hated the reforms of Cleisthenes 
and hence now sided with Hippias--"The Struggle for Power at 
Athens ••• ," p. 232. Yet it was not unusual for Alcmeonids to 
make a yolte face. They had done it before in the case of Pisis-
tratus. 
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to iron out its problems with the Persians in peaceful negotia-
tions. Who the leaders of the proposal were Herodotus does not 
say. Again, as in the ease of the first embassy, he refers gen-
erally to the Athenians. It would not be risky to suppose that 
the leaders who urged negotiations were the Alcmeonids. Thia is 
not in itself reprehensible. The Persians, however, overconfi-
dent and arrogant made again impossible demands as a result of 
which no room for maneuvering was left, and the Alcmeonids who 
1 
may have supported the proposal were now embarrassed. The oppo-
sition, no doubt, seized immediately the opportunity to denounce 
their foreign policy. Herodotus, writing ex post facto and when 
the events were still fresh in the memory of the people, adheres 
to the Alcmeonid position that the idea of an accommodation with 
Persia to avoid a confrontation was a valid one before the battle 
of Marathon. After Marathon and Salamis when the Athenians were 
basking in their triumph mere mention of such a compromise would 
have seemed cowardly and pusillanimous. Herodotus here records 
the events as an historian should do. He supports the policies 
of the Alcmeonids but fails to mention their name because this 
would have onl1 added fuel to the fire. The Alcmeonids were al-
ready under the cloud of a treason-charge. 2 The arrival of Aris-
tagoras occurred after the dispatch of the second embassy. The 
Alcmeonids adhered to their earlier position. They had no wish 
l Hdt V, 96,2. 
2Hdt VI, 123. Also Barris Gary Hudson, "The Shield Sig-
nal at Marathon," 1,)e A;erican Historigal Reyiew, XL, 1936-1937), 
443-459. 
to provoke the clumsy oriental giant. But the opposition had won 
its case by default when Artaphernes rebuffed the Athenian embas-
sy. It is also reasonable to accept that Hipparchus and his fol-
lowers sided with the Alcmeonids for the same reasons. This 
would explain his election to the Archonship in 496 and his later 
l 
expulsion. 
There seems to have been not only in Athens but elsewhere 
in Greece a "peace part: 11 which demonstrated its pacifism through 
an avowed hatred of war, which did not necessarily exclude patri-
2 
otism, as Victor Ehrenberg shows, but it did not contribute any-
thing positive to it either. Pindar and Theognis would be the 
most striking representatives of this peaceful movement, and at 
the same time a shining example that poets do not necessarily 
make good statesmen, and that politics, as Aristotle said, does 
not lend itself to poetical and philosophical flights, but is a 
very mundane and practical science that requires practical lead-
ers. Idealogues can be dangerous in politics.3 
Going back to the Ionian revolt, one can be sure that the 
1The fact that Hipparchus was exiled in 487 and refused 
to take advantage of the amnesty decree shows that he was angry 
at the Athenians who dealt him an injustice. Therefore, he was 
not willing to go back. He might have enjoyed seeing hie "ras-
cal" compatriots sweat it out, but not the city destroyed. An-
other type of extremism, stemming from spite. 
2Ehrenberg, op. cit., P• 123. 
3one is tempted here to draw a parallel with modern peace 
movements organized by intellectuals and student organizations 
against war, which, however, do not necessarily spell out what 
should be done in the face of danger or in the case of sustained 
aggression as the occasion might be. 
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clash between Greeks and Persians would ha.ve come sooner or later 
even without the revolt which served as pretext rather tha.n the 
real cause of the Greek-Persian confrontation.1 The Greeks were 
too restless a tribe not to needle the Persians occasionally and 
the Great Empire too great to leave the temptation pass unchal-
lenged of an expansion into the Aegean. Already they bad brought 
Macedonia under their heels. 2 From there Greece was only within 
a sling's throw. Herodotus is therefore wrong when he makes the 
twenty Athenian ships the beginning of mischief both to the 
Greeks and the barbarians.3 He is right, however, on his evalua-
tion. The Athenians acted without the required bridge-building 
in the military as well as the political field which would have 
made their action intelligible. There was no effort on their 
part to unite the Ionian Greeks or even the Greeks in Greece to 
face up to the consequence of their policy. The Ionians hardly 
deserved any help since they had not put aside petty squabbles in 
order to help themselves. Halicarnassus, for example, Herodotus• 
own city, stayed out of the revolt and so did the other Dorian 
cities 4 The Athenians did not mobilize themselves and their 
potential for any future action. They only decided to dispatch 
1Hdt V, 97,3. When Herodotus says that Darius inquired 
as to who these Athenians were and where they came from (Hdt V, 
105,1), he might show the anger of the king but not necessarily 
his ignorance. Surely, Darius must have been well apprized of 
the Greeks outside his dominion, especially the Spartans and the 
Athenians, the two most prominent cities of the Greeks. Hippiaa 
and other Greeks were in contact with the Imperial Court, which 
could not have been so ignorant as to hear about the Athenians 
now for the first time. 
2Hdt V, 18,1. 3 Hdt V, 93,3. 4 Hdt V, 103, 104. 
47 
twenty ships on the spur of the moment, and then in the face of 
adversity, after the burning of Sardis and the defeat at Ephesus, 
they quickly withdrew them as if they had rued their former deci-
sion.1 Their quick withdrawal proved to be as precipitous as 
their decision to act was. What about the fate of their Ionian 
"brethren" whom they had incited to revolt with their military 
presence'? Where was their love for "Ionian independence" for 
which supposedly they decided to send twenty of their ships? No 
wonder then that the decision of the demo§ seemed so erratic to 
Herodotus. 
l Hdt V, 97,3; 102, 2-3; 103. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE IRREPRESSIBLE GENERATION 
With the collapse of the Ionian rebellion Darius had 
reached the doorsteps of Greece. The Greeks must have realized 
their perilous position. Among them, the Athenians had placed 
themselves in a very awkward spot by so thoughtlessly drawing 
upon their heads the wrath of the king. We do not know what 
exactly was going on in Athens. Herodotus again fails to inform 
us about the various personalities which dominated the political 
stage and their policies. It is not hard to surmise, however, 
that the same forces continued to operate on the political scene 
as before. How strong the opposition was we do not know. The 
part1 of "appeasement" capitalized on the Ionian misadventure to 
get the upper hand again and so in the year 496 Hipparchus, the 
son ot Charmus, a cousin of the Pisistratida, was elected Archon 
Eponymus.1 Was Hipparchus pro-Persian? Was he simply for a 
political accommodation with Persia? Was he elected by the Athe-
nians because he was a relative of Hippias with the tacit under-
standing to try to reach some sort of a compromise with the Im-
perial Court? We do not know. We only know that he was exiled 
three years after Marathon. The reason for his exile is not given. 
1MoGregor, op. cit., p. 85. McGregor believes that the 
election of Hipparchus to Archonship in 496 after the Ionian fias-
co and before Marathon was an effort to conciliate the Persians. 
After 490 the1 expelled Hipparchus to settle the tyrant question 
b7 removing all s1111pathizers with the Pisistratide. This they did 
b1 putting in active service the law about ostracism forged by 
Cleisthenes. See also Ath• Pg.. 22. 
~he explanation given by Aristotle1 that the law of ostracism was 
passed by Cleisthenes for Hipparchus may give us a clue to the 
solution. Hipparchus was not ostracized when he should have been, 
according to Aristotle, because of the laxity of the demos. 2 But 
if Hipparchus had escaped unscathed then, he could not have been 
ostracized many years later for the same cause, especially if he 
had withdrawn from politics and preferred for himself anonymity. 
By the 480•s Hipparchus must have been on in years and no one 
would have bothered with him. The fact therefore that he was os-
tracized in 487 must have been due to his politics after the era 
of Cleisthenes.3 In the 490's then Hipparchus must have held 
l Ath, Pol. 22,1. 
3The law of ostracism then had run a full swing of the 
pendulum. Enacted against the possibility of tyranny and the 
elimination of the strongman, it was actually used as a party 
weapon against the opposition and the elimination of the weak, 
for certainly Hipparchus in 487 did not at all pose a peril. He 
and his policies were completely discredited; so the Athenians 
threw him away like old shoes. If one demurs to the fact the 
Athenians were justified because the Persian danger had not en-
tirely disappeared, then the Athenians ought to bear part of the 
responsibility also because in 496 when they felt they needed him 
they freely elected him Archon. Anyway, the fact that Hipparchus 
did not avail himself or the amnesty degree in 481 points to the 
fact that he must have been displeased with the Athenians and had 
no wish to return to the besieged city. No doubt he loved his 
city, but he must not have been altogether grieved to see his 
"bastard" compatriots "sweat it out." We have no evidence that 
he helped the Persians, although he is said to have been condemn-
ed to death in absep~a as a traitor, L cour s a ainst Leocrates, 
117.uinnapxov yap ~ v XaQµou, o~x ynoµELvav~a ~ v n~ac 
npo6oaca, tv ~~ 6f)~w KpCoLv, &A~ tp~µov ~ov dyw a fa ~v~a 
&avd~w ~oO~ov CDµLwoav~E,, tnEL6(j ~D' &6LKCa, o6K !Aa~ov 
~6 o~µa 5µnpov, ~fiv Etx6va ab~oU l~ &xpon6AEw,,xa&EA6v~E' 
xai.. ovyxwvEvoav~E' H.aL noi.fiaav~E' o~f)Aqv, l<iirJq>Louv~o Et, 
~av~nv &vayp&~ELV ~ov, ~AL~neCou,.xaf ~od, npo66~a' xaC ab~6, b~nnapxo' tv ~au~n ~v o~~AV avay~ypan~aL, xaC oC 
KAAoL 6t npo66~aL. 
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pro-Persian or rather "appeasement" policies, and he was now elect-
ed as Archon because of his political views. It could be that 
Hipparchus as well as Megacles might have spoken out against the 
Athenian involvement in the Ionian adventure, and Hipparchus is 
now elected Archon with an aim to satisfy the Persian Court. As.-
suming that this is true, it does not necessarily mean that Hip-
parchus was disloyal to his country. The Athenians would not be 
the only ones who made overtures to the kings. Many other Greek 
cities did the same.1 Megacles, the nephew of Cleisthenes, may 
have been associated with the appeasement party because be too 
was exiled after Marathon one year after the ostracism of Hippar-
chus. 2 
The policies of the party represented by Hipparchus 
finally failed. The Athenians in 493 elected ?hemistocles Archon.3 
The election of Themistocles signified the beginning of a more 
aggressive policy toward Persia. It was in the same year that 
Phrynichus presented his historical tragedy MLAD~Ou~AAwcrL~ 
(The Captive Miletus). Here Herodotus' account is again blurred. 
"The Athenians," he says, "showed themselves afflicted at the 
fall of Miletus, in many ways expressing their sympathy, and espe-
l Hdt VII, 6,1-2. 
20dd as it may seem, it is not impossible. The Alcmeonids, 
like other t1Pical Greeks, often changed sides. Combining with 
Hipparchus now would not have been anything abhorrent to them es-
pecially if Cleisthenea had been formerly displeased by the demgp, 
something very possible • 
.;Gustave Glotz, 'Io~op Ca ~~~ 'BAAQOO~ , trans. Takie 
Tsavea (Athens: Pii61isSer), 11, 3t). He makes Xan.thip-
pus the Archon of 493 by mistake. 
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cially by their treatment of Phrynichus. For when this poet 
brought out upon stage his drama, the Capture of Miletus, the 
whole theater burst into tears, and the people sentenced him to 
pay a fine of a thousand drachmas for recalling to them their own 
misfortunes."1 The Athenians exhibit here an inconsistent behav-
ior indeed. They express their sympathies toward the Milesians 
in a strange way, by condemning the author of the work. What 
2 Herodotus means by the "people," he does not specif,-. It would 
not be unsafe, however, to assume that the "people" sentenced him 
to a fine at the instigation of the "appeasement party, 11 thus 
taking advantage of the confused popular sentiments to strike at 
the opposition represented by Themistocles.3 Phrynichus was fi-
nally acquitted, perhaps with Themistocles' assistance. 
The third event of importance during this year was the 
return of Miltiades from the Chersonese which was occupied by the 
4 Persians in preparation of their Greek expedition. He was ac-
cused immediatel7 upon his arrival in Athens of tyranny in the 
Chersonese and was acquitted.5 
1 Hdt VI, 21,2. 
2Hdt VI, 21,2. It is interesting to note that Herodotus 
often omits names of persons implicated in actions that he men-
tions. Instead, he makes a vague reference to the Athenians or 
the people. It is extremely interesting to see that in the first 
and second embassy to Persia as well as here, all three cases in 
which the Alcmeonids could have been implicated, Herodotus is not 
at all explicit. 
3DeSanctis, op. cit., p. 364, believes that Phrynichus 
wrote the tragedy at Themistocles' advice. 
4 Hdt VI, 41,4. 
5Hdt VI, 104,2. Unfortunatel7 the accusers of Miltiades 
are not named by Herodotus even though he must have known them. 
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The accusers of Miltiades could not have been others than 
the opponents of Themistocles. Miltiades was anti-Persian. His 
presence at Athens strengthened the hand of the anti-Persian party 
and the appeasement party jumped on his attack. It cannot be 
ruled out, of course, that Themistocles viewed the opportune arri-
val of Miltiades as a favor of the gods, in which case he helped 
him overcome the trial hurdle and later joined hands with him for 
a common cauae.
1 Themistocles has already been mentioned so many 
times in connection with his anti-Persian policy that a few fur-
ther comments on the personality of this intriguing man, as well 
as the other political leaders, will not be completely out of 
place. 
Themistocles was §Yi generis a true maverick, restless, 
brilliant, imaginative, tormented, farsighted, and supremely prac-
tical. He is the mad genius, without being demented. Herodotus 
makes Themistocles a liomo Noyue in 48o. 2 That he certainly was 
not. Themistocles was born about 528. In 480 Themistocles was 
forty-eight years old. It is rather unusual from Herodotus' evi-
So Herodotus by omitting what is very important for us in extri-
cating the political complexities of the period has forced us to 
indulge in novel-writing which is euphemistically called histor-
ical conjecture. Herodotus might not have considered it impor-
tant, or he could have had an obvious reason. Megacles and 
Xanthippus are probably implicated in the attack against Milti-
ades and Herodotus comfortably ignored giving names. The par-
ticipation of Megacles in the trial of Miltiades can help 
explain not only his treatment at the hands of the Athenians in 
486, but also the attitude of Xanthippus in 489 which led to the 
condemnation of Miltiades. 
1Bignett, op. cit., p. 181, believes that Themistocles 
helped Phrynichus and Miltiades escape conviction. 
2Hdt VII, 143,1. &v~p t~ npwTov~ vEwOTC nap~wv. 
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dence then that at forty-eight Themistocles was making his debut 
in politics. We know that in 493 he was already an Archon epony-
mus, the highest civil official in the state.1 Before this high 
honor was bestowed upon him, Themistocles must have been known to 
the Athenians. He must have spoken in the assembly several times, 
and he must have identified himself with certain programs and 
policies. In 493 Themistocles was about thirty five years old, 
still a young man. Even if we did not have Herodotus' or Plu-
tarch'a information the odds would be that Themistocles because 
of his youth would be supporting an aggressive foreign policy. 2 
Hence he was one of the anti-Persian leaders, and he was elected 
to office in 493 because the appeasement policy had failed and 
the Athenians were finally led to believe that they had to change 
their policies. Themistocles was then overflowing with energy, 
youth, and ambition. He needed an issue to peg himself on, and 
what better issue could he find than anti-Persionism in the name 
of patriotism. The appeasement party already had its leaders. 
Themistocles then became the most aggressive leader of the oppo-
sitiQn. He was a smart and clever man. Plutarch makes frequent 
1R. J. Lenardon, "The Arohonship of Themistocles, 493-
492,11 Hietoria, V (1956), 401-419, examines the question of the 
chronology of Themistocles' Archonship to conclude that Themis-
tocles was Archon in 493/2 but probably held another office in 
482/1, perhaps that of strategos. He was a strategos in 480 and 
he does not think it impossible that he might have been a strate-
gos in 483 as well. 
2Plutarch, lbe'f'§J;ocles, II,5. 'Ev ~ar~ npwTaL~ TD~ v£6TDTO~ 6pµuL~ ~v~µaAo~ ~v KaC &o~&~µLTo~. 
My statement should not be taken to mean that a1.J.. young 
people are necessarily liberal or aggressive. 
allusions to his cleverness and ambition. He describes him act-
1 
·1·1 '-ing cxvoupyw~ •• Plutarch says: 
Speedil7, however, as it seems, and while he was stealing all 
the ardour of youth, public affairs laid their grasp upon 
Themistocles, and his impulse to win reputation got strong 
mastery over him. Wherefore, from the very beginning, in his 
desire to be first, he boldly encountered the enmit7 of men 
who had power and were already first in the city, especially 
that of Aristide~, the son of Lysimachus, who was always his 
opponent • • • , 
which is natural since Aristides was a cautious man by nature and 
had no liking for the wildcat practices and demagogic manners 
that stirred up the people's emotions rather than their reason. 
I do not know how reliable Plutarch's information always 
is, but surely we cannot afford to ignore it either. Since the 
ambition and hastiness of Themistocles is a recurring subject in 
Plutarch it should not be dismissed lightly. Thucydides, who is 
a much more cautious man with his statements, does not exclude 
the possibility that Themistocles might have been implicated with 
Pausanias in some kind of dubious activities or that he was act-
ing in secret with Pausanias to undermine Sparta's influence in 
the Peloponnese.3 Aeschylus believes the trick of Themistocles 
1 Pl~tar~ht Zhemistg9les, II,l~ , 
KaL ~ov~ov YEVOµEVOV OOKEL navovpyw~ ~OU ~WV 
v6-0wv KaL yvT)crCwv OLopt.crµ6v &vEA~!v 
and though he was .f';-om a poor~f'amily he was ~Tl npoat.pEOEt. 
µEyaAonpayµwv Kai noAt.~LKu~. 
2Plutarcht 7.'hamistgqlest III,l. 
3~huc. cxxxv. 'Ent.cpoi.~wv 0£ KaC t~ ~AAT)V 
nEAon6vvqc.iov. At this point Thucydides draws the amazing con-
trast in the workings and the mentality of the two systems and 
peoples. The Athenians not only had ostracized Themistocles, but 
upon the request of the Spartans moved quickly to seize him and 
bring him to trial. The Spartans, on the contrary, though a 
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just before the battle of Salamis whereby Xerxes was led to be-
lieve that he was receiving confidential information and decided 
to fight 1 before the Greeks escaped from the straits. If other 
examples of the cleverness and capacit7 of the man are needed one 
could easily mention the way he interpreted the mumble-jumble of 
the P7thian priestess and made it fit his military scheme. 2 He 
went even further in outdoing the cunning priests of Apollo. He 
turned the prophecy to mean that the Persians were really in 
trouble rather than the Athenians.3 The Athenians were probably 
flabbergasted, but they had no problem being swayed. 
Along with this cleverness, Themistocles combined a real 
far-sightedness which served his party, his country, and indeed 
the whole of Greece well at this superb hour of danger. First, 
totalitarian regime, in spite of the many rumors and information 
about the treasonable activities of Pausanias, did not move 
against him until they had almost air-tight evidence of his 
guilt. Thucydides adds with a touch of irony in his inimical 
manner (Thuc. CXXXII): 
~no~Ca~ noAAa~ napE!XE, ~avEpov (5µw~) 
ODµE!ov o~otv Etxov ~~ou ~v n~a~E~aav~E~ 
~EpaCw~ t~~µwpoUv~o ~vopa y£vou~ ~E ~ou 
~ao~A~~ou Bv~a ~ac tv ~~ nap6v~~ ~~µ~v 
~xov~cx. 
1D. Greene and R. Lattimore (eds.), "[Aeschylus•] Persae,n 
The Comilete Greek TraJedy (Chicago: Universit;r of Chicago Press, 
l9GOJ, I, 355-365. " rom Athenian Ranks a Greek approached 
addressing Xerxes thus: 
'When the gloom or blackest night 
Will fall, the Greeks will not remain, but leap. 
To rowing-bench and each by secret course 
Will save his life! And he your son, upon 
His hearing this, in ignorance of Greek 
Guile and the jealousy of gods, 
Harangued his captains publicly. '" 
1Hdt VII, 143,2.3. 2Hdt VII, 143,2-3. 
he persuaded the Athenians to use the money from a mine at Laur-
ion which by happy ooinoidenoe was discovered at this time for 
the construction of a fleet of 200 triremes for use against the 
1 Aeginetans, with whom the Athenians were at loggerheads for a 
long time. It seems that the Athenians again saw the force of 
his argument and followed his advice, advice which actually proved 
salutary for the whole of Greece. No doubt, the Persian danger 
was paramount in his mind. He also perceived the political power 
and prestige that a strong navy would bring to the city, the jobs 
and outlets it would create for the multitude of Athenians. If 
the Persians did not come, the Athenians would be left with a 
fleet, and Themistocles could further boast that the Persians did 
not come because of the fear of the Athenian fleet. If the Per-
sians did come, the possibility was that the Athenians would make 
good use of their navy, and his opponents would be silenced. In 
such a case his far-sightedness would be totally purged and his 
opponents discredited. Finally, the Aeginetan War warranted the 
construction of a strong navy, if the Athenians ever hoped to put 
an end to this bleeding wound. 2 The correctness of his assess-
ment was proven not only by Salamis but by the Golden Age. Thus 
in one stroke he transformed the social structure of Athens. He 
converted the Athenians, as Plutarch, quoting Plato, says, from 
1Hdt VII, 144. 
2Hdt VII, 144. u. Kahrstedt, "Themistokles," ~. zweite 
Reihe, Halbband X, Vol. V, sp. 1689 proposes that Themistocles had 
the idea of creating a state navy for ·defense purposes. 
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1 
"steadfast hoplies" to "sea tossed marines." Hence, again, the 
saying quoted by Plutarch that "Themistocles robbed his fellow 
citizens of spear and shield, and degraded the people or Athens 
to the rowing-pad and the oar. 112 This he did, Plutarch continues, 
quoting Stesimbrotus, over the public opposition of Miltiades. 3 
This man was the living opposition to Aristides, but like him he 
was the product of his times and of the democratized life as it 
emerged after Cleisthenes' reforms. Themistocles like Aristides 
4 had neither heroes nor gods as his ancestors. Nor was he like 
Xanthippue allied by marriage to the noblest family in Athens. 
He was a self-made man not born into a position of leadership by 
descent or wealth. His father was from a good Athenian family, 
but his mother was a Thracian, which put Themistocles at a disad-
vantage. 5 He was not a "pure-blooded" Athenian and the Athenians 
1H. Bengtson, H!§toria, II (1953-54), 485, maintains that 
the idea was not original with Themistocles, that the Thasians 
after the siege of Histiaioa, ten years before Themistocles' pro-
posal had done the same thing. For the sea strategy in 480 he 
credits Themistocles. Hdt VII. 144. Victor Ehrenberg, The Greek 
§ta~e (New York& Norton Library Paperbacks, 1964), p. 85, states 
that Themistocles followed the example here of the island of 
Thasos earlier. 
2Plutarch, ;hemistoc~es, IV, 3. 
3At this point the information of Plutarch is confused. 
The Archon of 490-489 was Aristides not Miltiades, and in 483 
when the proposal for the naV1 was made Miltiades was long dead. 
Aristides was exiled by Themistocles and it was probably over 
this issue. Plutarch, T~emistogle;, V, 5. Ath. Ppl. 22,7. 
4Hdt VI, 35,1. Miltiades was 6 &.re Ata:H.OU 'tE KO:L 
AtyCvD~ yEyovw~. 
5Themistocles' mother was a foreigner. Plutarch, :r»,emis-
tocles, I, 1-2. Cleisthenes' grandmother was a foreigner and so 
was Cimon•s. Cleisthenes' grandmother, however, was a pan-hellenic 
frowned upon "hybrids." It was enough to create in the boy, who 
must have been reminded of his "impurity" by the others many a 
time, a strong complex which he tried to overcome later in his 
life by his bumptiousness, his sagacity, and opportunism. 
The opinions of the ancients are divided about him. Hero-
dotus cautiously praised him especially for his role at the Battle 
of Salamis.1 Thucydides, in an admirable passage describes the 
nature of the man in his inimitable brief manner. 
For indeed Themistocles was a man who had most convincingly 
demonstrated the strength of his natural capacity, and was 
in the very highest degree worthy of admiration in that re-
spect. For by native insight, not reinforced by earlier or 
later study, he was beyond other men, with the briefest de-
liberation, both a shrewd judge of the immediate present and 
wise in forecasting what would happen in the most distant fu-
ture. To sum up all in a word, by force of native sagacity 
and because of the brief preparation he required, he proved 
himself the ablest of all men instantly to hit upon the right 
expedient.2 
prize that added to Cleisthenes• descent. Cimon's situation was 
different. He had grown up in another environment, whereas The-
mistocles had grown up in Athens. Georg Busolt, Griechisgte 
Qt§chicAtt {Gotha: Heldesheim, G. Olma, 1893-1904), II2, 6 O; 
Jean Hatzfeld, jlcibiade: iyudg su; l'histoire Q'Athtiits ! la fin 
du ve si!cle (2d ed.; Paris: Presses Universitaire, 1951), p. 2, 
fnt. 2. 
1 Hdt VIII, 124,1-2. 
2 Thuc. I, CXXXVIII,3. 
~v y~p 8EµLOTOKAij,, ~E~aL6Ta~a 6~ ~~crew, tcrx~v 
6nAwcra, KaC 6La~Ep6VTW' ~L t, av~6 µ&AAOV tTfpou !~LO' -Oavµaaa~ otxECa yap ~vvtaeL KaC otTE npoµa-Owv t~ aVTDV 
µn6tv, o~~ lnLµa-Owv Twv ~E napaxpijµa 6~ lAaxCaTD' ~ouA~' 
KpaTLcr~o' yvwµwv KaC Twv µEAA6v~wv tnC nAErcrTov ~ov yEvn-
croµfvou KpLo~o~ EtKncr~~,--- KaC ~6 a6µnav Etnetv ,daew' 
µfv 6uvdµEL, µE~t~D' 6f ~pax~~D~L Kpd~Lcr~o' 6~ ovTo' 
a~T00XE6L&CELV ~& 6fov~a tyfvE~o. 
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He combined with this ambition for glory and did not hesitate to 
use all kinds of means to achieve his goal. This does not pre-
vent Thucydides, however, from alluding to his implication in 
1 Pauaanias' schemes. Aeschylus believes the ingenious story of 
Themistocles' trick the day before the naval battle of Salamis 
and some even suspect that the P§rsag was written to remind the 
Athenians what they owed to Themistocles. 2 Others, like Timoc-
reon the Rhodian,3 a contemporary of Themistocles, have no kind 
words for him, and I am sure that the Carystiana, the Parians, 
and the Adriana would have hated him thoroughly. 4 In the eyes of 
Aristides, he must have appeared a slick and unscrupulous oppor-
tunist. Yet Themistocles was capable of lifting himself far 
above petty political squabbles during those crucial junctures of 
1 Thuc. I, CXXXV. 
2 See page 54 above. Plutarch~ :rJl.eJiS$ocl~, XX.I, 2-3· 
'AAA' ft !~YE liauoavCav ~ Ka~ ~uyE aviLnnov 
~ i;uyEa.A~tiS*Coav, £yw o'~p~o~&Coav £na~v£w 
Kvop' l&pav ~n ~-Oavav 
tA~Erv tva AWO'tOVa tn&r e~µLO'tO~Ati' ~x-OapE Aa~w 4EUO~Ct v' lfo ~ KOV' 1Lpo66i;av' ts, T ~ µoxptov~a e£!vov 
f:o V't' 
&pyupCo~, OM.UpaA~M.i;o!oL nEL0-0£C, ov KCt'tayEv Et, 
n&i;pav'IaAuo6v, 
AQ~WV of ~pC' &pyupCou i;dAavi;' ~~a nAEWV Et, 
BAE-Opov, 
~0'11~ µ£v KO.'tcXYWV &:oCKw,, 't"OV' OE tKOLwx.wv, ~ou, 
ot KO: Cvwv. 
&pyupCwv tn6nA£w,, ~o&µot 6' tnav66KEVE 
yEAoCw, ~uxpa Kpta. napfxwv 
ol 6' ~O~LOV K~UXOV'tO µD ~pav 8EµLO'tOKAEu, 
y&vfo.Sa~ 
3Hdt VIII, 112. 
4 Plutarch, Themistocles, XXI, 1. 
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history in which the future of the state hung in the delicate 
balance. He did that promptly at the council before the Battle 
l 
of Salamis. He resigned any Athenian claims of leadership to 
the Spartans who seemed set on it, provided that they only 
listened to his plan. Even now his 11knavery" did not entirely 
leave him. He "allows" himself to be bribed by the Euboean and 
in turn he bribes Eurybiades and Adeimantus while making a sub 
stantial profit. 2 Before leaving Artemisium he contrived a way 
whereby he tried to detach the Ionian Greeks from the barbarian 
fleet and sow distrust and suspicion among their navy.3 He did 
not hesitate to use reason and blandishment to carry his point 
through to Eurybiades at the Council of Salamis. 4 After Salamis 
he was said to have gone to the islands (Andros, Paros, Carystos, 
etc.) and to have pressured the islanders for money like Milti-
ades ten years earlier.5 He had the "nerven to suggest to the 
perplexed Athenians the abandonment of their city, their homes, 
their sanctuaries in order to save themselves, because he be-
1Hdt VIII, 59-60. 
3Hdt VIII, 23. 
2ildt VIII, 3-4. 
4Themistocles headed an expeditionar1 force to the islands 
after Salamis (Hdt VIII, 110-112). His purposes were multiple; 
first to pay the crews of the fleet (Godolphin, o~. cit., p. 698, 
ftn. 13), especially now that Athens was destroye , a form of war 
indemnities for guilt by association. Secondly, to ingratiate 
himself to the Athenians who had deserted their city at his ad-
vice, and now returned to a burned city. Thirdly, he might have 
intended to make some profit for himself. Such a devious purpose 
was not certainly below his principles. Hdt VIII, 61-62. 
5lidt VIII, 112. 
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lieved that human beings were more valuable than bricks and 
stones.1 He could have easily moved the emotional Athenians with 
a so-called patriotic speech about their hearths and their tem-
plea, but he was too much of a practical man to indulge in such 
insipid sentimentalism. 2 His decree for the return of the exiles 
just before the Battle of Salamis shows his loftiness and practi-
cality. This was a time for national unity and dedication against 
the common cause, and he who had caused the exile of his opponents 
now proposed their recall. Why should he let those resources idle 
or even tempt them to side with the Persians? This was the man 
who was charged with the responsibility of leading the state in 
its hour of crisis. 
Themistocles' opponent, Aristides, the son of Lysimachus, 
from the ~ of Alopeke, was a major contrast in temperament. 
Herodotus does not mention his name nor his policies in the pre-
Marathon era, but then Herodotus does not always mention names, 
1The literature on Themistocles' decree is rich. See 
D. A. Hardy and W. K. Pritchett, "Suggested Changes in the Troizen 
Inscriptions," Annual of thi British Spho9l of Athens, LDC (1964), 
30-31. L. Moretti, "Studi sul decreto di Themistocle," Rivista 
di Filogogia e di Istruzioni Classi9a, XCII (1964), 117-124. ·u. 
Berve, "Zur Themistockes Inschrift von Troizen, 11 ~' 1961, p. 
,50. Anthony E. Raubitschek, "Die Inschrift als Geschichliches 
Denkmark," Gzm:iasium, LXXII (1965), 511-522. For a bibliography 
on the subject up to 1962, S. Dow, "Bibliography of the Purported 
Themistocles Inscription from Troizin," ~. LV (1962), 105-lo8. 
2 Kahrstedt, op. cit., sp. 1689 1692, thinks that the de-
struction of Athens Sy Xerxes caused his temporary eclipse after 
Salamis and the emergence of his opposition, Xanthippus, Aristi-
des, Cimon. If this view is correct, and I have my reservations 
about it, we have no evidence to prove it, outside of the fact 
that Themistocles did suffer temporary eclipse after 479. Plu-
tarch, Tbemistogles, XXIV, 4. 
L 
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even though he must have known them, nor does he give a fair pie-
ture of the domestic forces in Athens at this time. We therefore 
have to depend on Plutarch's biographical sketches. Aristides 
was born 520 or a little earlier. In the Marathon campaign (490-
489) he was a strategos. l In 489 he was elected Archon EponjVJlUS. 
This means that Aristides was one of the prominent political 
leaders in the later 490's. Aristides admired and emulated above 
all other statesmen, Lycourgus the Lacedemonian. 2 He, therefore, 
favored the moderate democracy as it had evolved from the reforms 
of Cleisthenes and opposed the opportunist Themistocles, espe-
cially his political machinations. 
All the ancient sources agree that Aristides was the most 
upright man of his time.3 He had neither the sharpness of Themis-
tocles nor his far-sightedness, nor his malleableness. He was a 
"square" who believed in the traditional principles and ultimate 
goodness of his fellowmen. He had a lofty conception of his obli-
gations as a public official. That he established a high repute 
of "justness" during his lifetime among a people who loved to find 
faults with their leaders is in itself a mem.orial to the man. 
Herodotus describing him says, "from that which I have learnt of 
his way of life, I am myself well persuaded that he was the best 
4 
and justest man at Athens." Timocreon the Rhodian, a contempo-
1Plutarch, VII, 1-2. 2i>1utarch, VII, 1-2. 
3Ath. Pol. 23, 
4Hdt VIII, 79. 
~6v tyw v£v6µLKa nuv~avoµ£vo~ av~ou ~6v ~p6nov, 
!pLC~OV av6pa y£vlo&aL lv ~&~VaL~ Ka( 6LKaL6~a~OV 
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rary poet, praises Aristides while degrading Themistocles with 
bitterness.1 Aristides must have violentl7 disliked the politi-
cal somersaults of Themistocles as reckless and dangerous for the 
state. He was guided b7 his reason and honesty where Themi.stoc-
les acted on his intuition. Aristides too had ambition. No one 
without a grain of ambition in him makes politics--especiall7 
Greek politics--a career. His ambitions, however, were tempered 
and circumscribed by his high character. Themistocles was out to 
win and would let nothing harness his limitless energies. He 
used his energies to achieve the ends without regard to the means. 
Aristides would not care to achieve the ends, if the means were 
not fair. As a result, Aristides faded in his death, while The-
mistocles was a m7ster1 even in his death. 
Themistocles' nature was "unscrupulous" and "easil1 car-
ried with impetuosity into any and every undertaking. Aristides 
was a firm character, intent on justice, and admitting no falsi-
t1 or vulgarity or deceit, not even in any sport whatsoever. 02 
Aristides was the exact opposite in character to Themistocles; 
"Themistocles was a reckless agitator."3 Aristides was the oppo-
4 
site. The same course happened on the part of Themistocles who 
opposed the measures of Aristides only because they were his, and 
Aristides would introduce some of his measures through other men.5 
1Plutarch, :r9gietogle§, XXI, 2-3· Charles Fornara, "Some 
Aspects of the Career of Pausanias, 11 Historia, XV (1966), 257-271, 
examines the poems cited in Plutarch. 
2Plutarch, II, 2. 3Plutarch, III, l. 
4Plutarch, III, 2. 5Plutarch, III, 2. 
L 
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It seems that he had opposed Themistocles' naval policy for two 
reasons. First, because of its effects upon the Athenian societ7. 
Aristides was a conservative gentleman who saw with suspicion the 
expansion of democracy not because he disliked democracy but be-
cause he feared that it would lead to ochlocracy. Secondly, 
Athens had repelled the enemy with its hoplite force, and he prob-
ably believed that she could do it again.1 Themistocles, on the 
contrary, emphasized naval armaments because he perceived that 
the future of Athens lay in maritime expansion and because this 
widened his popular basis. 
Their exact position as leaders of the "popular party" is 
not clear. If we have to surmise differences of policy beyond 
their personal differences in means, it would not be unfair to 
conclude that prior to 490 Aristides was more of a fundamentalist. 
He remained truer to the constitution of Cleisthenes whereas The-
mistocles desired to carry the democratization process started 
by Cleisthenes a step or two further. There is no doubt that the 
motives of Themistocles are not entirely non-political, but he 
was also in accordance with the demands of the tim.es. 2 
About Aristides' foreign policy before Marathon we know 
nothing. The fact that he was elected strategoe in 490 and Archon 
in 489 indicates that whatever hie disagreement with Themistocles, 
1That Aristides opposed the Naval Bill is of course a 
hypothesis but not an unsafe one. See Beloch, op. cit., p. 142 
and Desanctis, op. cit., p. 377. Also Hignett, op. cit., p. 183. 
21 believe that he used the extension of democracy as a 
whipping issue for the purpose of building up his political basis. 
he was not opposed to war. The Athenians would not have elected 
to the office of atrategos a man who refused to give his total 
commitment to the war cause. The friction between the two led 
eventually to the ostracism of Aristides in 483.1 It is the only 
instance in which we have a clear statement on the reasons for 
the series of ostracisms that took place in the post-Marathon 
period. Thus ostracism which was invented earlier as a weapon 
against potential tyrants deteriorated from the very beginning to 
a means whereby personal rivalries found their base fulfillment. 
The story about the boorish and illiterate fellow, who asked Aris-
tides to write Aristides' name on his ostracon, because he was 
"tired of hearing him everywhere called 'The Just'" may not be a 
true story but it is true to the nature of petty Greek politics 
and the Greek character. 2 The expansion of democracy did very 
little to alleviate the evils of intolerance from which Greek 
politics suffered and as a token of that the leader of the opposi-
tion was banished because one of his virtues was his proverbial 
honesty, the constant mention of which irritated some of his con-
temporaries. 3 
1Plutarch, Ari§kide§, VII, l 2, mentions that Themistocles 
caused Aristides' ostracism but does not go into details as to the 
exact causes for it. Ath, E01. 22,7. Hdt VIII, 79,1. 
2Hdt VIII, 79. Herodotus also emphasized the integrity of 
Aristides. Plutarch, Ari§tidea, VII, 5-6. 
3Plutareh, Aristide§, VII, 5-6. I can here mention a sim-
ilar modern parallel, P. Canellopoulos, the former leader of the 
ERE party in Greece. Mr. Canellopoulos has been known in modern 
Greek politics as an extremely honest and straightforward politi-
cal leader. In the elections of 1961 he was elected to parliament 
only because or a special law that gave priority in the count of 
l 
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Aristides returned to Athens in 480 just before the Battle 
o! Salamist taking advantage of the amnesty decree promulgated by 
the Athenian d§mos at the behest of Themistocles. Themistocles 
was plagued with all kinds of problems and needed all the help he 
could get. Aristides meanwhile was watching the development of 
events. He had noticed that the Athenians could not have with-
stood the Oriental hordes that had descended upon Greece and that 
Themistocles' navy offered at least a hope. He realized how right 
Themistocles was, and how wrong he was to oppose the construction 
of a navy. He was therefore the first to extend hie hand of re-
conciliation, and Themistocles accepted it gladly.1 From here on 
Aristides would support Themistocles' "sensible" proposals, but 
he would not hesitate to oppose him in matters of conscience. In 
479, he was elected strategos and commanded the Athenian force 
that participated in the Battle of Plataea. 2 He exhorted the 
Athenian soldiers at Plataea to fight gallantly that the world 
may think that not even Marathon was due to Miltiades alone, or 
to fortune, but to all the Athenians.3 Before Plataea, some aris-
votes to leaders of parties and former Prime Ministers. Though he 
received fewer votes than another man of the same tickett Mr. 
Canellopoulos was elected as the beneficiary of the above law. 
Some Greek voters of the opposition pointed with delight to the 
fact that Mr. "Honesty" made it onl;r through the back door. The 
fact that a mediocre provincial town lawyer did otherwise receive 
more votes than a distingy.ished man, they could not see as an af-
front to the voters' intelligence or their lack of it. 
1 2 Hdt VIII, 79,2. Hdt IX, 28,6. 
3Plutarch, Aristeidest XVI, 4. Again this is a possible 
clue to the fact that at Miltiades' trial his defense had main-
tained that Marathon was due to him while his opponents deflating 
his contribution asserted that it was owed to the Athenians and 
to fortune. 
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tocrats, wished to abolish democracy. Aristides opposed the abo-
1 lition or democracy and voted for its expansion. He cooperated 
with Themistocles for the construction of a wall against the 
wishes of Sparta, 2 but frustrated the maverick yet ingenious pro. 
posal of Themistocles to burn the naval station of the confeder-
ate Hellenes, so that the Athenians would remain the only lords 
of the sea.3 
Aristides was sent out as general along with the youthful 
Cimon to persecute the war and expel the Persians from the Aegean 
Island (478), and Plutarch notes that he used gentleness and hu 
maneness, tact and diplomacy to attract the Greek islanders to 
Athena, especially since the Spartan commanders were being boor·-
ish and offeneive. 4 Be was chiefly responsible for the secession 
of the Asiatic and island Greeks from Pausanias. Be also fixed 
the quotas for the members of the Delian League in an equitable 
manner.5 His statesmanship set an excellent precedent for the 
Athenian democracy. If the Athenians as leaders of the League 
1 Plutarch, Aristeiae§, XXII,l. 
'EnEC ot &vo:xwPDOO:V~O:~ El~ ~6 &a~u ~ov~ 
'A&T1vo: C ou~, b 'AP i.a~E C OTJ~ fwpa: C:rnouv~o:,~ ~'Div 011µ0-xpa~ Co:v &noAa~Etv. 'Api.a~EC6D~ yp&~Ei. 4n~Caµa~a 
xoi.v~v Elvai. ~~v noAL~ECav xaC ~ou~ ~pxov~o:' ta 
'A~Dvo:Cwv n&v~wv alµna~o:i.. 
2 Atb• Pol. 23, 4. 
3Plutarch, Tb.§;istoQles, XX, 1-2. 4 Ath, Pol. 23,5. 
511 Aristides, 11 Oxford Classical Dictionar: (Oxford: Claren-
don Press, 1961), p. 92. Aristotle attributes to Aristides the 
responsibility for the initiation of a form of a democratic Hstate 
socialism" for which we cannot be sure however {Aih, Pol. 23,5, P• 
90). 
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had followed his tactful course, instead of a boorish policy, they 
could have adjusted themselves to requirements of the leadership 
and its responsibilities in the League, and they could have fore-
stalled its inglorious end. This is then the man who in the 490's 
often opposed Themistocles. In comparison, Aristides' political 
acumen was inferior to that of Themistocles. Aristides was a 
decade behind times. It was also fortunate that Themistocles' 
rascality prevailed until 480. Greece owes him an eternal debt 
for its salvation. His case proved that in history justness and 
honesty are not always virtues. 
The third political person active during the time men-
tioned by name by the ancient sources is Xanthippus. (The order 
in which the four major personalities are described does not neces-
sarily imply their age or date of entrance in the political arena. 
Miltiades and Xanthippus were older than Themistocles and Aristi-
des. They were also engaged in politics earlier.) He was the son 
of Ariphron. He was a friend of Cleisthenes whose niece he had 
married. Aristotle1 makes him the successor of Cleisthenes in the 
leadership of the popular party before Aristides and Themistocles. 
We have a strange situation here and the above statement of Aris-
totle does not clarify things; it befuddles them. Xanthippus may 
have been older than the other two, but he was active down to the 
470's. 2 Herodotus unfortunately again fails us at this point. 
He does not bypass an opportunity to mention his name in relation 
with some Athenian accomplishment, but on the question of his 
l Ath. Pol. 28,2. 2 Hdt IX, 114,2; 120,4. 
political orientation prior to the 480 1 s and 490'a Herodotus is 
1 
mute. Xanthippus was married to Agariste, the daughter. of Hip-
pocrates. It is interesting to note that from now on the famous 
house of the Alcmeonids is going to continue its prominence, not 
by its male line but through its female branch. Herodotus 
strongly emphasizes this fact not only by his silence concerning 
the Alcmeonid males, but chiefly with the dream of Agariste just 
before the birth of Pericles. Another prominent Alomeonid woman 
was Isodike, the woman who kept the erotically frivolous Cimon, 
the son of Miltiades, prisoner to her charms till his death. 2 
The mother of Alcibiades, that playboy and pest of the Athenians 
during the Peloponnesian War was a granddaughter of Cleisthenes, 
the reformer. It is logical to surmise that Xanthippus was a 
partisan of Cleisthenes and his reforms. As a member of the Alc-
meonid family he was an opponent of their rivals, the Philaids.3 
In 493 he must have participated in the indictment of Miltiades. 
What was therefore his relation to the popular party and the 
other two leaders of that party? What was his attitude toward 
the Athenian foreign policy in relation to Persia? Strange as it 
may appear on the surface, Herodotus, the narrator of Agari~te•s 
dream, does not say. But the strangeness is only superficial. 
1Hdt VI, 131 1 136; VII, 33; VIII, 131; IX, 114, 120. 
2Cimon married Isodike, whose father, Euryptolemos, the 
son of Megaclea, was a member of the Alcmeonid clan. Plutarch, 
Cipaon, 4-16. See also llignett, op. cit., note J, p. 396 for the 
problems connected with the date of their marriage. 
3Atbs Pol. 28,2. 
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Herodotus who provides valuable tidbits of historical information 
elsewhere is deliberately silent here. The reason is not hard to 
surmise. Xanthippus had followed a dovish policy, like Megacles 
his brother-in-law, and had joined him in the indictment of Milti-
ades which was mainly a personal vendetta and which further dis-
credited the Alcmeonids. It was probably this muddy affair and 
his dovish policy during the Ionian debacle that cost Xanthippus 
his party position. This can explain the general statement of 
Aristotle who makes Xanthippus leader of the people before Aris-
tides and Themistocles. Xanthippus was exonerated afterwards by 
his participation in the Battle of Marathon. But even after the 
Battle of Marathon, while Herodotus seems to go out of his way to 
mention for us Aristides' ostracism1 as well as Themistocles•, 2 
he says absolutely nothing about Xanthippus' or Megacles' ostra-
cism.3 
l Hdt VIII, 79,1-2. 
3It is indeed fascinating to see how human beings succumb 
easily to nature's frailties. Herodotus• somewhat charming exam-
ple is simultaneously instructing and amusing. Herodotus gives 
us as much information as he can on the various facets of his 
story. He demonstrates his mental and emotional predilections 
here not by deliberate falsification which would have been repre-
henaible--and he knows it--but by discreet silence. He mentions, 
tor example, the struggle between Themistocles and Aristides 
(VIII, 79). In the same place, he also speaks of Aristides• os-
tracism. Further down (VIII, 109), while describing Themistocles' 
activities, he interpolates an invaluable piece of information 
for us but not necessarily indispensable to his story: the ostra-
cism of Themistocles. It is worth noting that he mentions Xan-
thippus and some of his services on behalf of the city {Hdt VI, 
131, 136; VII, 33; VIII, 131; IX, 114, 120). In a masterfully 
subtle and simple manner, he draws a picture of the unbribable 
character of Xanthippus {IX, 120) thereby lifting him into spheres 
far superior in this respect to the vulnerability of Themistocles. 
Yet in all references he glosses over in silence the ostracism of 
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I have already made reference to the fourth person domi-
nant in Athens between 493-489. His arrival from the Chersonese 
in 493 exacerbated the already tense situation. Miltiades was 
born between 554-550. Thus he was the contemporary of Cleisthenes 
and Hippias. It seems that he was treated well by Hippias because 
between 528-516 he is in Athens. In 524 he was "electedn Archon.1 
At this time, with the advice of Hippias he went to the Chersonese 
to take over the property of his uncle and oik•;tes, Miltiades 
Senior. 2 It seems that an adventurer's blood ran in the veins of 
the Philaids because both Miltiadeses have been political wizards. 
They were the dare-devil types, the dynamic characters the likes 
of whom have built empires, conquered frontiers, founded dynasties. 
They were of the stuff that Zorba the Greek, Sir Francis Drake, 
etc., were made. If we are to believe Herodotus,3 Miltiades the 
younger made himself master of the Chersonese again by ruse. He 
continued to maintain his position with the aid of a mercenary 
force and a marriage alliance. In 514 he had advised the Ionian 
leaders to cut the bridges on the Danube and leave Darius strand.-
4 
ed among the wild tribes of the Scythians. The story is of 
Xanthippus. The same, of course, is true about Megacles, the son 
of Hippocrates. He brings in his name and his aristocratic line-
age as well as his and his family's many services to the state but 
not a word of his ostracism, even though it was a common secret 
(Hdt VI, 131). 
61-62. 
l Wade-Gery, op. cit., P• 156. Also Meritt, op. cit., PP• 
2Bdt VI, 33-39· 
4Hdt VI, 103-104. 
3 Bdt VI, 39. 
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1 
course subject to dispute. 
Wade-Gery suggests that Miltiades had agreed with the 
Scythians to break off the bridges of Darius. The plan was foiled 
2 
only because the ruler of the Lamsakene disagreed. He was loyal 
to Darius. After Hipparchus' murder, Hippias allied with Darius 
through his daughter's marriage to the Lamsakene and broke off 
with Miltiades. This does not explain, however, why the Lamsakene 
did not betray Miltiades to Darius. If he did so Miltiades would 
not have been able to stay in the Chersoneae longer. Wells be-
lieves the story that Miltiades left the Chersoneae and returned 
there at the time of the Ionian revolt.3 Nepos, who makes Milti-
ades retire to Athens on the return of Darius from Scythia, is 
. 4 
simply not reliable. The story is not unlike Miltiades' charac-
ter and Herodotus who is guilty usually for crimes of omission 
may be right after all. 
In 493 Miltiades is back in Athens. He had participated 
in the Ionian revolt and is forced to flee the Chersonese after 
the collapse of the revolt.5 His adventures in the Chersonese 
and his contacts with the Persians had enriched his military 
knowledge. Like Philip of Macedon later he had done his military 
apprenticeship abroad, and he was going to use that military 
1923)' 
1Wade-Gery, op. cit., pp. 158-159, accepts it as true. 
2Hdt VI, 41,3. 
3Josep:Q. Wells, Studi,es,4 Herodotus (Oxford: Blackwells, 
p. 118, also accepts the story. 
4Nepos, Miltiages, 3.6. 5Hdt VI, 104,l. 
.. 
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knowledge for the salvation of Athens. But this is a later story. 
For the time being he found himself facing a trial because of his 
behavior in the Chersonese.1 At least this was the charge. The 
real motives however were personal. Who were his accusers. We 
do not exactly know. Herodotus is again silent. 2 If we elabo-
rate on his silence as we have dc.:ne before, we are forced to con-
elude that Herodotus is silent on purpose. The purpose of course 
is that he is covering up for some people in this messy affair, 
and these people naturally are again the Alcmeonids and their 
allies. It is otherwise unthinkable that Herodotus who knows and 
says so many things about the Philaids, some of these of doubtful 
nature, would have omitted to provide the names in this drama. 3 
Besides the Alcmeonids there might have been others. These would 
be the Athenians who had lived or had interests in the Chersonese 
and disliked Miltiades' despotic rule. H. Berve does not doubt 
that Miltiades committed foolish acts when he succeeded to the 
4 
rule of the Chersonese. Those who advocated a propitiatory poli-
cy toward Persia would have a reason to join in the accusation of 
Miltiades, even though most of them would be the partisans of the 
Alcmeonids and Hipparchus.5 Those who must have accused Miltiades 
for his conduct toward them in the Chersonese had an indirect but 
1Hdt VI, 
3Hdt IV, 
137, 140. 
104,2. 2 Hdt VI, 104,4. 
137-138; VI, 34, 39-41, 103, 104, 109, 110, 132, 
4 H. Berve, "Miltiades: Studien zur Geschichte des Mannes 
und Seiner Zeit, 11 Hermep-Einztl§chri!ten {Berlin: Weidmann, 1937), 
Heft 2, pp. 40-67. 
5Busolt, op. cit., p. 566; Me:er, oi. cit., p. 184; De-
sanctis, op. cit., p. 365; 2.Allt IV, 189; Be och, op. cit., p. 20 • 
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pertinent bearing on the case. The nature of his rule in the ab-
etract, despotic or not, had really no legal foundation and could 
not be adjudicated by an Athenian court. There was no law that 
defined the nature of government abroad, especially when it con-
cerned a non-Athenian territory, like the Chersonese. But if 
legally Miltiades' opponents had no case, in reality they fired a 
warning salvo across the bow of the Athenian political ship. This 
pertained to Miltiades' despotic tendencies and his identifica-
tion with a lengthy tyrannical rule. If democracy is a way of 
life, so is tyranny and so far Miltiades' way of life was dicta-
rorial. A warning was not entirely out of place twenty years 
after the tyrannies in Athens. The court was not convinced and 
Miltiades was freed, with the aid perhaps of Themistocles who was 
the Archon of that year and whose anti-Persian faction must have 
1 
welcomed Miltiades' presence. Be was subsequently elected one 
of the strategoi by the Athenians till his death in 489. 2 
l Glotz, OR· cit., P• 30, mistakenly says that Xanthippus 
was the Archon of the year. 
2Berve thinks that after the Archonship of Themistocles 
the oligarchic party of theyvwpLµoL under Miltiades' guidance 
became the dominant power in Athens. They turned toward Sparta 
for help; hence the future philo-Spartan policy of Cimon and the 
cooling off of the relationship between Miltiades and Themistoc-
les who owed loyalty to no one. Berve, op. cit., p. 70. Wells, 
oR• cit., p. 112, makes Miltiades leader of the J?!ralioi. Berve 
ascribes to the dominance of Miltiades the decision to go out and 
fight the Persians at Marathon, instead of staying in the city. 
This decision was not, he says, a decision to be taken by the 
generals but by the people. Miltiades in his capacity of a lead-
er of the people urged them to go out and fight (Berve, OR· cit., 
p. 77). That the Spartans were the only Greeks, outside of 
Plataea, who volunteered to help the Athenians is also attributed 
, to Miltiades' policy (~., p. 75). Also the proposal to free l........__ the slaves in order to fight and to honor those who would fall in 
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The Athenians should have deduced from the proceeding of 
the trial one cardinal lesson. Miltiades was like a stallion 
whose effervescent power should be harnessed for the welfare of 
his state and his own well being. They did harness his power dur-
ing the Battle of Marathon, and it produced marvels. Then, 
flushed by the effects of victory, they let him loose and an ex-
plosion took place. 
This brings us to the next important episode of Athenian 
history, soon after the Battle of Marathon, the Parian Expedition. 
Even though this affair is not free of dispute, we have more light 
because Herodotus broke his silence and discussed it.1 Miltiades 
was the hero of Marathon. His military astuteness saved Athens 
from the Persian danger in 490. And so "The fame of Miltiades, 
which had before been great at Athens, was increased. 112 He told 
them that he wanted a fleet of seventy ships with an armed force 
and money, without informing them what he intended to do with this 
force. Re only promised them that he intended to make them rich.3 
Seventy ships, before the construction of their Armada of two hun-
the battle alike with free Athenian citizenship was Miltiades' 
idea (~., P• 77). 
1Hdt VI, 132, 133, 136. Nepoa, Miltiadeg, 7,8. 
2Hdt VI, 132,l • 
••• KaC np6~Epov E~6oKLµfwv n;ap6 ~anvaCoLaL, 
~6~£ µaAAov a~~a~o. 
3Hdt VI, 132. 
at~~aa:' 6E vta, tp6oµ~Kov~a xaC o~pa~Cnv 
~E KaC XP~µa~a ~3nvaCou,, o~ ~p&aa' a,L ln; ~v tn;L-
o~pa~£da&~aL X~P~V, &AA& ~d, a~~od~ Ka~an;AoU~LEtv 
fiv o t t1i-;wv~a L--.!A-&riva'ro L 6£ ~ou~o LO L bmp3£v~E!; n;a:-
ptoooa v. 
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dred, was probably all the naval force of Athens. They delivered 
it into the hands of Miltiades. What was the purpose of all this? 
1 Herodotus states that the motives of Miltiades were personal. 
There is also another explanation. There are those who agree 
with Ephorus that the Parian expedition was an effort on the part 
2 
of the Athenians to establish their predominance in the Cyclades. 
Nepos, who, according to How,3 follows Ephorua, spells out as the 
motives of the expedition a general commission to punish the 
islands which had medized and a public policy of establishing 
Athenian power in the Cyclades. The concealment of the object of 
4 the expedition ascribed to Miltiades by Herodotus would there-
fore be the only way of preventing its betrayal to the Persians 
and the islanders and might be absolutely essential to the SUC·-
cess of the enterprise.5 It is an ingenious argument indeed, but 
its correctness is to be doubted on two counts. The argument an-
ticipates events that happened a decade later. The Athenians did 
not have plans of expansion in the Aegean Sea yet. 6 Berve doubts 
if the Athenians, who could not defeat the Aeginitans, could hope 
1Hdt VI, 135· A personal vendetta against the Parians. 
2FGrBist, II, 59. See also Desanctis, op. cit., p. 366; 
Beloch, op. cit., I, 24,2, P• 106; ~. IV, 252-253; Buaolt, 2E.:. 
cit., pp. 581-589; W. W. How, "Cornelius Nepos on Marathon and 
Paros, 11 Journal 9f Hellenic Studies, XXXIX (1919), 61; Meyer, 2R.:. 
2.!i•t p. 197; G. B. Grundy, 1'be ~reat Pers+an War and Its frelim-
inarie§ (London: J. Murray, 1901 , PP• 160-194. 
3How, OE· cit., p. 59. 4Hdt VI, 132. 
5How, op. cit., p. 59, does not accept this line of 
thought. 
6Berve, Miltiades, Oi· cit., P• 77. 
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to subdue the islands. He does not believe that their navy was 
strong enough for such an undertaking. We have therefore to ac-
cept Herodotus' explanation of the expedition. Miltiades would 
get his personal grudge satisfied while the Athenians lined their 
pockets with a few talents. He thought that this was a fair bar-
gain until the scheme collapsed and Miltiades had to pay with his 
money, his honor, and his life. 
It seems that Miltiades had hoped that a show of force 
would accomplish his goal. l To his chagrin, the Parians decided 
to resist and neither Miltiades nor the Athenian navy were pre-
pared logistically and psychologically for a protracted siege. 
To make matter worse, Miltiades received a wound and this added 
to the campaign's ill-luck. Miltiades returned a broken man. 2 
There was much resentment against him. Xanthippus exploited the 
turn of sentiment against Miltiades and called for his punish-
ment. 3 Again I think we should pause here and ponder some of the 
ramifications of the whole episode because it could provide us 
with valuable insights to the Greek mentality and the nature of 
Athenian political "psyche." 
The Greeks were an emotional people. They could love one 
and be blind to all his faults, but with an equal force they could 
1Hdt VI, 133· 
3 Hdt VI, 136tl• 
2 Hdt VI, 135,l. 
~~DVULOL OE tK napou MLA~LUOEa &noVOO~DOav~a 
~oxov tv 0~6µQ0L, ot ~£ ~AAOL xaC µaALO~a 2&v%Lnno~ 
6 ~pC~povo~, ~~ ~ava~ou onayaywv ~n6 ~6v 6Dµov MLA~La-
6 €a to Cwli£ ~ij~ 'A-0-qvcdwv &.nch'q~ e:t V£l1.£V. 
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hate someone and disregard the commands of reason. Immediately 
after Marathon Miltiades became their idol. He asked them to put 
at his disposal their entire force, and they did. They were prom-
ised money, and they asked no questions. The decision of the 
Athenians is here of the utmost importance. There is an essential 
constitutional question involved here for which the democracy of 
Athens was squarely responsible for the sake of its own welfare. 
Miltiades may have acted as a "corsair," but Miltiades was the 
type to behave in this pattern.1 It can be argued that the Athe-
nians by placing their entire force at his command thoughtlessly 
placed their constitution also at his mercy. The example of Pi-
sistratus who only with a bodyguard upset the constitution in 562 
should not have been lost to them, if they were really constitu-
tionally minded. 2 I do not doubt that the opposition must have 
raised this point now as well as in 493, but the Athenians over-
looked it. From this vantage, then, the attitude of the opposi-
tion could be justified. Miltiades loved power and was exactly 
the sort of stuff out of which tyrants are made.3 Be had made 
himself tyrant in the Chersonese and there is no reason that he 
should not try it in Athens. The prosecution had raised that 
4 point in the 493 trial against him. Those who must have object-
ed to the expedition5 must have raised this point. The Athenians 
l Glotz, op. cit., p. 39, says that Miltiades acted here, 
as always, like a corsair. 
2Ath, Pol, 14, 1. 
3 Bdt VI, 39,2. 
Hdt I, 59,3-4. 
4Hdt VI, 104,2. 
5The ancient sources are not clear on this point, but ab-
solute unanimity is well-nigh impossible. Xanthippus must have 
had his reservations before. 
• 
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refused to heed the lessons of history. They were overwhelmed by 
the success of Marathon. They were not willing to listen to the 
reasonable objection that such an eventuality was possible. 
Otherwise, they would not have conceded to him without adequate 
guarantees. Whatever reservations they might have had were over-
powered by the thought of money thrown before them by Miltiades. 
Justly, Herodotus concludes with a slight touch of cynicism that 
"The Athenians being thus assured, gave him [the shipa]. 111 In 
free states the responsibility for decisions taken collectively 
is equally universal. The Athenians were asked to decide upon 
the proposal of Miltiades. The debate was openly conducted in 
the ecclesia, and the ecclesia adopted the proposal foregoing the 
moot point, the purpose and destination of the expedition. The 
responsibility, therefore, is theirs as well as Miltiades'. Xan-
thippus, if petty, at least was consistent with himself and his 
family's inveterate hatred of the Philaid. 2 The murmurs, com 
plaints, the gossip of the Athenian citizens about Miltiades' de-
ceitfulness showed only their irresponsibilit1, irrationality, 
and erratic behavior. Miltiades was made the sacrificial victim 
for his own fault as well as the people's superficiality.3 That 
some of the rumors about bribe were unfounded can be demonstrated 
by the inability of the Spartans to unseat Polycrates of Samos 
1Hdt VI, 132. 
~anvatoL 6€ ~oG~oLOL lnap&fv~E' naptboaav. 
2Since he was married to one of the Alcmeonid family, he 
was part of it. 
3 CAH, IV, 70. 
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1 
which had led to the same accusations of bribery. The Athenians 
were so anxious to punish the culprit, their former hero, that 
they would not postpone the trial for medical reasons. Had they 
been able to wait for a while, nature would have spared them the 
embarrassment--which they did not feel anyway. Xanthippus, rid-
ing high on the public wave of resentment, asked for the penalty 
of death. 2 So intense were political passions and personal ha-
tredl According to Herodotus, who seems to have no compunctions 
about naming the role of the Alcmeonids in this case, the Atheni-
ans, who were deceived in their hopes for easy wealth, decided to 
puni~h their former idol with a fine of fifty talents.3 Plato 
gives us a different version, less flattering to the Athenian 
demos. He says that the Athenians voted to throw Miltiades, the 
hero ot Marathon, into the pit, "and had the president [J>qtanis] 
not intervened on his behalf, he would have been thrown in it."4 
1Th.e prosecution may have based its case on certain laws. 
"You have an ancient law, one held in great respect, that if any 
one deceives the people by false promises, he shall be brought to 
trial, and if convicted shall be J>unished with death" ('li;cr·u v Vµt'v 
v6µo~ &pxa!o~, ~wv ~aAw~ ooKouv~wv ~XELv, &v TC~ unoax6µE-
vo~ ~L ~6v ofitJ..OV £~0.1I.t.nDOTj KpCVELV ••• Demosthenes against 
Leptines, 135· Also,"There is a law that !l' anyone dece!ve the 
people b1 false promises he shall be brought to trial" v6µwv 
5v~wv, tav ~Lu ~6v oijµov Unoax6µEvo~ t~ana~DOD, Ela-
ayy£A.Cav ElvaL nEpC afnov. J. H. Lipsius, Das A'tisc:A1 
Recht und Reghta Vertahrep (Leipzig: O. R. Reisland, 1905 , I, 180. 
2Hdt VI, 136tl• 3adt VI, 136,3. 
4Eta ~6 p&pa~pov iµpaAELV ~4D~Caav~o, KaC Et 
u~ bLa ~6v npd~avLv, l:vfnEcrEv &v. 
Plato, Gor,iaa, 516 E. See also Bonner and Smith, op. cit. P• 207; 
How, o~. cit., pp. 60-61; G. Busolt und B. Swoboda, 9riecaipche 
Staats unde ("Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft," 2 aufl., Zweite 
HHlfte; M"tinchen: c. H. Beck, 1926), pp. 888-889, fnt. 6; Berve, 
Mil;lrias115t op. cit., pp. 99-101; and Gomme, op. cit., pp. 324~325. 
CHAPTER V 
THE RASH OF OSTRACISM 
Our condottiero was gathered to his forefathers soon after 
the trial. His death was a fitting epitome to his turbulent life. 
He had lived by the sword and died from a campaign wound. !rhe 
Athenians made him a scapegoat for his Parian miscalculation and 
their own thoughtlessness and disappointment. The reverberations 
of the trial, however, were to echo throughout the decade. The 
Parian fiasco numbed the war party into silence temporarily only. 
They had no arguments to defend Miltiades' ignominy. Only some of 
his friends would enumerate hie past achievement on behalf of 
Athens.1 But the political pot was boiling, and the death of Mil-
tiades was going to exacerbate the political enmities that existed 
among the Athenians. !rhis is obvious. It is to be deduced from 
the political events that followed otherwise we,have no data on 
Miltiades. We have no details. Herodotus again is silent about 
such a politically fertile decade. Two years after the burial of 
Miltiades, Hipparchus was exiled from Athens by the law of ostra-
cism enacted earlier. Why Hipparchus? We must go back for a 
while if we are to understand the circumstances of hie banishment. 
Aristotle's evidence is not clear. 2 We can only deduce that 1t 
Hipparchus were to be ostracized in the last decade of the sixth 
century the act would have been completely illogical and unjust, 
on the evidence of Aristotle. He might have been a relative of 
1 2 Hdt VI, 136,2. Aih, Pol. 22,4. 
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Bippias, but Aristotle states categorically that he had not partici-
pated in their "evil deeds." How could Cleisthenes then move for 
the expulsion of an innocent man? He did not. Kagan proposes an-
other solution to the problem. 1 Hipparchus was an active party 
leader in the time of Cleisthenes and the latter passed the law of 
ostracism against Hipparchus. Hipparchus, however, was left an al-
ternative. He had the opportunity to cooperate with the party of 
Cleisthenes and forego ostracism or persist in his opposition and 
take the risk of exile. Thus with the threat of ostracism hanging 
constantly over his head Cleisthenes was able to check the politi-
cal ambitions of Hipparchus and his part1 and to force him into a 
coalition based on their mutual opposition to oligarchy. Hippar-
chus was spared in this manner from ostracism. 2 The argument is 
an excellent piece of historical conjecture. It goes without say-
ing, of course, that there does not exist even the slightest shred 
of evidence to support this view. I cannot, however, for one ac-
cept it. I must seek therefore the explanation for Hipparchus' 
expulsion elsewhere. Hipparchus was not, in my estimation, ban-
ished, because Cleistbenes, bis contemporar7, knew fully well that 
this would have been a grossly unjust act. Hipparchus had done 
nothing inimical to the Athenian policy.3 His relation to Hippias 
was simply an accident of birth. Cleisthenes who was a moderate 
man and had wished to let sleeping dogs sleep could not arbitrar-
ily submit Hipparchus to such an unfair ordeal. So far the expla-
398. 
1Kagan, "Origin and Purpose of Ostracism," op. cit., p. 
3Ath, Pol. 22,4. 
nation of Aristotle is correct.1 Aristotle's statement that oatra-
ciem was passed with Hipparchus specificall1 in mind is, at its 
2 best, doubtful, and at its worse an ex post facto statement. But 
A'c'"" cc.. t/8, 
then Hipparchus could not have been dragged out of his mothballs 
in 488/7 to satisfy the revengeful feelings of the political fac-
tions in Athens for at least two reasons: first, because the is-
sues of the 48o•s bore little relation to the issues of the 5l0 1s. 
Secondly, because to condemn a political nonentity would have been 
no revenge but a "pseudo-revenge." The Athenian politicians were 
out for blood and not for dead carcasses. If Hipparchus had not 
been active in Athenian politics for many years he would have been 
politically decolorized. The Athenians could not have turned 
their rage against a political nonentity. It follows then that 
Hipparchus had not been politically inactive. He was an Archon in 
496 representing, as I mentioned above, a "rapprochement" policy.3 
During the events of Marathon, Hipparchus was not mentioned any-
where. This does not constitute an argument against him, but 
there is a possibility, a possibility which I accept as true, that 
Hipparchus carried his "propitiatory" policies to the point of 
4 
non participation. The story of the shield, true or not, was 
circulated only because there were elements in Athens on whom such 
an accusation could be ascribed and Hipparchus could have been one 
1 Ath. fol. 22,4. 2 Ath. Pol. 22,4. 
3see above p. 45; Dionysios Halicarnassus. Antiquities 
VI, I. Busolt, op. cit., P• 378, fnt. 2. 
4 Hdt VI, 121,1; 123,1; 124,2. 
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of them. This is not all. Hipparchus was also a relative of Hip-
piaa, and Hippiae had accompanied the Persians to Greece. Be had 
conducted them to Marathon, 1 waiting for the fifth-column to join 
him. 2 It is only natural that the Athenians• hatred for the trai-
tor Hippias reflected on his relatives, especially the most ex-
posed to the public eye. Hipparchus was vulnerable and the war 
party knew it. They decided to strike at their opposition, and 
Hipparchus was a logical choice. We do not know who resuscitated 
the law of ostracism. It would not be out of line to hypothesize 
that Miltiades' partisans were in agreement with the proposal. 
The partisans of Miltiades' party found the opportunity to avenge 
his condemnation. Professor Kagan describes the judicious use of 
ostracism as a tribute to Themistocles' political acumen.3 He 
considers the choice of Hipparchus as a master stroke that seemed 
4 
as an act of patriotism. I have already described the choice 
as an excellent one. That the war party with which Themistocles 
was also associated was behind this act admits to doubt. But 
that the rash of ostracisms that took place in this decade were 
products of political astuteness is a question of debatable nature. 
Ostracism did not eliminate the opposition but a single leader. 
Often if misused, and it was misused even in this decade as we 
1Bis father had landed in Marathon where he was joined by 
groups who came from the city and marched triumphantly in the 
city to become its tyrants. 
2Hdt VI, 107. 
:;Kagan, 11 The Origin and Purpose of Ostracism," op. cit., 
P• 399. 
shall see, it strengthened political intolerance to a degree that 
was fateful to the Greeks. Finally, it deprived the individual of 
ten years of his life for no crime whatsoever, but simply because of 
his political ideology and his courage to express publicly his 
ideas. 
The next person to be ostracized is Megacles, a nephew of 
Cleisthenes. The evidence again is meager. The circumstances, 
nonetheless, point to similar causes for his expulsion. Aristotle1 
makes him a friend of the tyrants. No other information is given 
by him as to his politics prior to the exile. Herodotus describes 
him as the son of Hippocrates, grandson of Megacles, brother of 
Agariste. This definitely identified him as an Alcmeonid--if any 
identification were needed. Herodotus, however, following his 
customary discreet silence on many of the facets of the turbulent 
Alcmeonid history does not mention his ostracism or his political 
career. He believed that what the people did not know would not 
hurt them, and that if he kept his peace perhaps posterity might 
know only the Alcmeonids' contribution. 3 Thia means that Herodo-· 
tus did not consider their part during this perilous time some-
thing for which History, Herodotus, or the Alcmeonids could feel 
justifiable pride in recording it in the diptychs of history. 
It seems that Megaclea subscribed to the policy of accom-
1 Ath, Pol. 22,5-6. 
3How true this could prove is evident from the case of 
Cleisthenea. We do not know anything about his later years and 
his death. If Aristotle did not mention in passing the ostracism 
of Megacles, we would have been equally in the dark. 
5, ttt;J/ 1,; vA¥\ ~ £)'>111..i I(&<.,' 
2 
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modation. This is the meaning of Aristotle's categorization or 
Megacles as the friend of the tyrants. The Alcmeonids had not 
been the friends of the tyrants before, and they had won for that 
l the designation of misotzrannoi for which they felt proud. Nor 
is the classification of Megacles among the friends of the tyrants 
entirely fair. Hegacles might have sided with the appeasement 
party. This, however, does not mean that he was pro-Persion or 
for tyranny. In retrospect, his foreign policy was a failure, but 
only in retrospect. Had Athens been defeated historians might 
have argued--if the Greeks as a subject were worth arguing about--
that an acco111D1odation with Persia would not have been such a mon-
strous idea. The motives of Megacles might have been misguided 
therefore, but we have no reason to describe them as treacherous. 
Themistocles, Miltiades, and the other anti-Persian leaders proved 
to have a better instinct in these matters. 2 
This is not though the only mistake of Megacles. Megacles 
became a bitter man and refused to participate in the Battle of 
Marathon. We have no explicit statement of his non-participation, 
but the sources that should have mentioned with pride such a patri-
1 Hdt VI, 121,1; 123,1. 
2A similar modern analogue could be drawn in the case of 
Vietnam and the opposition to the U.S. policy by many so-called 
liberals. One may disagree with them and the correctness of their 
attitude, but no one could easily lump them as traitors because 
they oppose their government's official policy. In the same man-
ner one should not classify Megacles and those who followed a poli-
cy of accommodation as traitors. Misguided they might have been 
but not necessarily traitors. The Athenians did not see things in 
this light, however, and the persecution of Kegaclee and the others 
was a natural result. 
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otic contribution are again silent. Pindar praises the house of 
Megacles as the most illustrious in whole Greece.1 In support of 
his eulogy he refers to the role of the Alcmeonids in rebuilding 
the Delphic Temple but says nothing about Marathon. Why? There 
are two explanations. The first is that Pindar was a pacifist 
2 himself and had no liking for war--any war. The other, and the 
most crucial, is that the Alcmeonids' role in Marathon was noth-
ing to boast about. Pindar was retained by the Alcmeonids to 
praise their victories and had to sever his ideas from theirs. He 
would be obliged to mention their part in Marathon as he mentioned 
Megacles' Pythian victory, but unfortunately there was no part to 
mention. 3 Lastly, their Pythian victory and their connection with 
1Pindar, Pzthian Ode, VII; Hdt VI, 121-127. 
2Another instance that pacifism, even though it might have 
lofty motives, if it is not based on a realistic appraisal of the 
situation can be catastrophic. 
3c. A. M. Fennell, Pindar Ol;ympian and Ptthian Odes (Cam-
bridge: University Press, 1893), "Pythian t5de,"if. !!he pYthian 
in honor of Megacles• victory was written c. 486 only months after 
Megacles was ostracized, perhaps because of it. Pindar makes no 
mention of his ostracism. Willamowitz makes the interesting com--
ment about ostracism in connection with Megacles. He says that 
ostracism did not deprive the ostracized person or his family of 
their honor or property. On the contrary, it was a mark of per-
sonal distinction. In the case of Megacles, it was intended more 
against his family than his person. This is probably true. I 
will only add here the~ t Megacles was probably the most active 
political member of his family and so ostracism was directed 
against him. In some way the above statement of Willamowitz 
strengthens my suspicion that the Athenians struck at their dis-
tinguished members leaving only mediocres and political non-enti-
ties. Fortunately they had no dearth of able men. Willamowitz-
Mollendorf, finsiargs (Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1922), p. 
154. 
Along ~ith wrangling over Miltiades' affair and the anti 
Persian policy, the reforms of 487 may have a lot to do with the 
intense political feeling that ended up with the multiple ostra-
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the medizing Delphians is collateral evidence of their neutrality 
during the Marathon campaign. 
The Marathon episode glossed over in silence, Herodotus 
l takes up the mysterious shield episode. Herodotus oddly enough 
does not deny it. He grasps the episode to dispel the rumors in 
connection with the Alcmeonids and to deny the theory that they 
are friends of the tyrants. '.rhe statement that follows gives out 
more hints than Herodotus intends. "My (one will say), but they 
bore perhaps some grudge against the Athenian communality, and 
therefore betrayed their country. But there were none at Athens 
2 that were of better repute than they." I think that Herodotus 
here, by denying it, actually betrays the fact that the Alcmeon-
ids were angry against what they believed to be the ungrateful 
ge101, consequently they abstained from the events of the 490's. 
Herodotus' arguments against the truth of the charge are not con-
clusive and have not been accepted by all scholars. 3 I personally 
believe that the Alcmeonids were not responsible for the shield 
cisms. In such a case, Hipparchus, Megacles and even Xanthippus 
might have represented the conservative views. 
Ra.ubitschek claims that Xanthippus may have been the lead-
er of the Democratic reforms in 487. Raubitschek, "The Ostracism 
of Xanthippus, 11 op. cit., pp. 257-262. The fact that Aristides 
opposed the Naval~ill indicates that he was against reform. 
l Hdt VI, 121,1; 123,l; 124,2. 
2 Hdt VI, 124,1. 
'AAi\.a y&p tow' lxLµEµ,6µEvo~ 'A&nvaCwv ~~ 6~µw 
1tpoc:6Coooav 't~V JW't'pC6cx. ov µ.~v wv fioav a<pc:wv rfi\.i\.oL 
OOYl.LjJ.W'tEPOL iv ye: 'A&q,vaCoLOL lXv6pE~ ooo' ot µ.ai\.i\.ov 
l"t"E't Cµ.Ea'to. 
3.rennell, op. cit., P• 231. 
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and they were simply suspected because of their conduct before the 
war and duriagit.1 True or not the story must have been believed 
by many in Athens and served its purpose, namely to discredit the 
Alcmeonids. It must have weighed heavily on the minds of those 
who cast their vote for Megacles' banishment. And so Megacles was 
made an outcast. Another member of the irrepressible generation 
that followed Cleisthenes was out of commission. It is an ironic 
conclusion to the career of the nephew of the man who originated 
ostracism. It is also an ironic twist of fate for an institution 
' 
that was invented for the protection of democracy. The instrument 
devised for the would-be tyrants becomes in the Democracy the or-
gan of the majority for the extirpation of the minority viewsl 
We have to proceed. The decade suffered from an epidemic 
of ostracism. The next victim of ostracism named by Aristotle 
was Xanthippus, "who was unconnected with the tyrants. 112 What was 
responsible for his ostracism? The statement of Aristotle does 
not give us a clue. Herodotus again remains silent. Xanthippus 
was not only a member of the Alcmeonid family by marriage but he 
was also the father of Pericles, a personal friend of Herodotus. 
So Herodotus has an additional reason to be careful. The fact 
that Xanthippus was allied to the Alcmeonid family militates 
against him in the 580 1 s. Be could be accused by extrapolation. 
Xanthippus, however, had in his favor the fact that he was in 490 
1There is also the possibility that the story of the 
shield might have been circulated by Miltiades' party in their 
struggle against the opposition. 
2 Ath, Pol. 22,7. 
90 
connected with the anti-Persian struggle and probably played a 
prominent role in the battle.1 This enabled him to take the ini-
tiative in 489 against Miltiades. Had he not fought at Marathon, 
he would not have dared to raise his head against the popular hero. 
The same fact, however, must have exposed him to the hatred of Mil-
tiades• party and generally to the anti-Persian party. The begin-
ning of his problems which resulted later in his ostracism lies 
here. 
Xanthippus' political position is not very clear. Raubit-
schek makes him definitely belong to the democratic party along 
with Aristides and Themistocles. 2 An inscription discovered in the 
1949's complicates further the case of Xanthippus. The inscription 
reads as follows: xa& v-& ( 1.nnov) (H.a'tcO cpc:o 1. v &:A.c: 1. 't £p6 v npu ('ta) 
V£LOV 't'~o'tpa(lf.OV 'AppC} ~povo~ naroa ~a(A.)1.0~'&:61.H.£LV. 
Raubitschek suggests thatnpu'tavc:rov be taken as the "inner" ob-
ject ot&:6Llf.£rv substituted for the usual1t6A.1.v {or 6Tjµov ) to 
satisfy poetic diction. He then suggests that Xanthippus may have 
been attacked for violating the sanctity of the npu'tav£rov , the 
Sacred Hearth.3 Oscar Broneer claims that by pr1taneon here is 
meant Public Kitchen. Hence Xanthippus became a parasite who ate 
long at public expense. Be notes that there is nothing known 
about the operation of public meals in the early fifth century to 
1 Hdt VIII, 131,1. Diod. Sic. XI, 27. Also Bignett, 2E.:., 
cit., PP• 177, 180, 182, 183. 
261. 
2Raubitschek, "The Ostracism of Xanthippus, 11 op. cit., p. 
3IJUJi., PP• 257-262. 
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which the ostracon belongs. But at the time of Aristophanes the 
abuse had become a public scandal. Aristophanes (Knights, 280-
281) denounces the Paphlagon, i.e., Cleon, for running to the 
prytaneion with an empty belly and coming out with a full stoma.ch. 
Broneer says that the spectators knew that the public kitchen was 
referred to here. To dine in the Erytaneion was a coveted reward 
for Athenian politicians. Xa.nthippus, who was eating at the "R!.1..-
taneion is here cursed for his rascality. For a long time he had 
abused Athenian hospitality.1 In reference to Raubitschek'a 
Sacred Hearth, Broneer sees no such profanation recorded elsewhere. 
He surmises therefore that no such meaning was intended by the pot-
sherd. 
Eugene Schweigert does not agree with Broneer. He thinks 
that the text of the inscription is an elegiac couplet. Its style 
is too lofty for oatraca where in general the writers were illiter-
ate. The crux of the problem lies in the word nptnave::!ov • He 
believes that it should actually be the genitive plural of this 
\tlord. Xanthippus becomes "a curse of the leaders," a. common poetic 
usage, he says. The ostracon therefore asserts that Xantbippus, 
the son of Arriphron, has become especially harmful as a curse of 
the leaders. The leader that comes to mind is Miltiades. We may 
then suppose, according to Schweigert, that the writer of the os-
tracon was a partisan of Miltiades who was now voting for the 
10. Broneer, "Notes on the Xa.nthippos Ostracon," W,, LII 
(1948), 341. See Kni~hts, 445-446; Lysias, A~ainet Andocides for 
Impiety, VI, 52-53; Aischines~ Against Ktesi~ on, ii!; nemosthenes, 
QA the Crowp, 159. aAEl.'tEpOr; more common X1'h11P 1.0~ • 
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expulsion of Xanthippus for his role in the trial of Miltiades.1 
The last person mentioned by Aristotle as exiled prior to 
Salamis was Aristides. In the interval between the banishment of 
Xanthippus and the ostracism of Aristides an important event oc-
curred which was going to contribute to the salvation of Athens 
and of all Greece, though the Athenians did not realize it and the 
other Greeks were not even aware of it. This is the discovery of 
the mines of Maroneia from where the city made a tremendous prof-
it. 2 Athenians looking for quick riches even since the time of 
the Parian expedition, recommended the distribution of money. It 
was an unorthodox proposal. Themistocles had different ideas, and 
he blocked it. He counter-proposed that the money be entrusted to 
the hundred richest men in Athens, one talent each, and if the 
manner in which the money was spent pleased the people "the invest-
ment of the money on behalf of the city was well done; if the 
people failed to agree with the way the money was invested, then 
they would return the money to the creditors. 113 Regardless of the 
results that the proposal produced, the proposal itself is a curi-
oua one. How did the leader of the popular party convince the 
people to go along with this puzzling suggestion, Aristotle does 
1i:ugene Schweigert, 11Xanthippos Ostracon," AJA, LIII 
(1949), 266-267. This is congruent with my assertion that the 
partisans of Miltiades were chiefly responsible for the first 
ostracisms mentioned by Aristotle. Their motives were primarily 
personal, the revenge of Miltiades• condemnation engineered by the 
Alcmeonids. 
2Ath. Pol. 22,7; Hdt VII, 144,1; Thuc. I, 14. 
3Ath. Pgl. XXII, 7. Translation mine. 
~D~ n~AEW~ EtvaL ~~v oa~&v~v, EL OE µ~ ~oµCoaa~aL 
~a XPDµa~a nap& ~wv oavELoaµtvwv. 
9.3 
not indicate. 1 What the relations were between the leader of the 
people's party and the great "capitalists," who, one might expect, 
did not belong to his party ia a mystery that only a devilish per-
son like Themistocles could answer. 2 Why did the money men of 
Athens consent to the scheme, and what profit they believed they 
would derive beyond the promotion of the state's welfare is to us 
an enigma. The people adopted Themistocles' advice and a coali-
tion between the people's party and the wealthy Athenians was 
formed. It shows again that the lines among parties were never 
rigidly delimited in the Athenian state. 
The proposal itself, to say the least, was constitutional-
ly highly ambivalent. But then the Athenian voters were "open-
mindedtt people and never argued over "petty" constitutional points. 
The case of Miltiades earlier who refused to divulge the purpose 
of his expedition was not dissimilar to Themistocles' case now, 
who refused to state the purpose for the distribution of money 
among the Athenian rich men.3 Yet the people espoused the propos-
al. So quickly history's lessons are forgotten1 The world goes 
blundering onl 
Themistocles' refusal to explain his plane was due, partl1 
1Ath, Pol. 22,7. 
2Ath. Pol. 22,7. 
KEAEvwv ~or~ nAouaLw~a~oL' laDvaLoL, 6avECaaaL. 
3Ath. Pol. 22,7. I think that Themistocles was trying to 
accomplish two things here. First to ingratiate himself to his 
natural political enemies by placing his trust in them for the 
success of his plan, and secondly to convince the people to go 
along with the plan. 
at least, to the well-known fact that Aristides would object to 
1 the construction of the navy. No doubt, Aristides must have ob-
jected not only to the Navy Bill, but also to the invidious pro-
posal. From hindsight, Themistocles' insight has been justified, 
and the world is thankful to him. But this is only from hind-
sight. The proposal may have been comparable to the genius of the 
man who initiated it. But looked upon from the standpoint of the 
pre-Salamis period, Aristides was not entirely wrong. It does not 
matter. Themistocles had hie way, and Aristides was ostracized. 2 
Later, he may have been the first to admit that he was wrong op-
posing the Naval Bill. 
Now that the fourth person mentioned by Aristotle has been 
ostracized, I think it behooves us to stop briefly and contemplate 
what ostracism meant. Hignett believes that the law of ostracism 
was rightly invoked against Aristides after his ill-timed opposi--
tion to the proposal on which the salvation of Athens in the im-
pending war was dependent.3 It is indeed self-evident that the 
salvation of Greece was achieved mainly by the Athenian ships. 
Th.is certain knowledge is, however, from hindsight. I am concerned 
with the rightness of Aristides' ostracism or not, and the wisdom 
of ostracism in the 480•s. From the ver1 same fact that Th.emis-
tocles was able to navigate Aristides' ostracism through the Assem-
bl7, I am inclined to think that he could have passed his Naval 
l Ath. PpJ:. 22,8. 2 Ath, Pgl. 22,7, 
3Kagan, "Origin and Purposes of Ostracism," op. cit., P• 
397; Hignett, op. cit., p. 189. 
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Bill despite Aristides' objections. If so, then why' ostracize a 
man who by character would have abided by the people's decision 
anyway? One could say at this point that in ostracizing Aristi-
des Themistocles managed to muzzle the opposition with one blow.1 
I must be permitted to have my doubts on this. Greeks are not so 
easily shaken from their obstinancy. On the other hand, ostra-
cism deprived the state of the services of able men if we are to 
judge from Aristides' and Xanthippus• post-Salamis performances. 
What is more important, is the fact that the clause on ostracism 
as interpreted in the 48o•s was a flagrant misinterpretation of 
constitutional theory. Ostracism was not meant to be by its 
founder a weapon against democracy but an organ for its protec-
tion. It was not designed to serve as an instrument against free 
expression by the opposition, but a shield from the would-be ty-
rants. We do not have information on Cleisthenes' view, but he 
might have thought that variety of opinion did no harm to democ-
racy and this is the reason why he did not emplo7 it as a weapon 
against his opponents. Ostracism, at its worst, increased intol-
erance; at its best, it is to be doubted for its effectiveness. 
1 Kagan, "Origin and Purposes of Ostracism," o;p. cit., 
PP• 400-4ol. 
CHAPTER VI 
THE BANDWAGON 
While an ostracophoria was directed against one person or 
was a contest between two or more, in practice there was no obli-
gation on the part of the voter to cast his ballot against any 
one of them. He was free to write the name of anyone whom he 
wished to see banished. The major candidates of ostracism in the 
48o•s are known to us from history, mainly from Aristotle's ~-
naion Politeia. Besides these historical references, a great num-
ber of ostraca dug up since the 1930's have shed ample light to 
the institution of ostracism. One is virtually faced with a swarm 
of ostraca that bear names not otherwise known to us from history 
against whom perhaps only a few votes were cast. The tact that 
votes were cast against them is in itself evidence that the per-
sons concerned with political men of some prominence in their day. 1 
This further proves, if any further proof were needed, that the 
misapplication of the institution by the erratic Greeks tended to 
punish prominence and permitted the reign of the mediocre. A 
great many (524) ostraca were discovered in 1947, nearly as many 
as in all previous archaeological expeditions. All of them were 
found in the same general area, the deep valley between the Areo-
pagus and the Hill of Nymphs. Most of the pieces came from a 
single large group consisting of 491 ostraca, the largest ever dis-
1Eugene Vanderpool, "Some Ostraca from the Athenian 
Agora," Hesperia, VIII (Supplement, 1949), 394. 
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covered. The deposit from which they came was one meter by one 
and a half meters deep and six to eight meters across. It divided 
to three layers, all of them judged to be contemporary for ostraca 
with the same name appear in all three of them and there are in-
stances in which fragments of the same ostracon were found in dif-
ferent layers. The known names of the ostraca are all persons 
active in the early part of the fifth century.1 Among the new 
ostraca there were three "unique" and tantalizing pieces which 
bear the names apparently connected with the great Alcmeonid fam-
ily. One of them reads KAa:A. 1.ca:vo~ MEO't'EVO~ which could be 
Kallixenos, son of Cleisthenes, probably an otherwise unknown son 
of Cleisthenes, the legislator. Another reads 'Ap1.a't'ovuµo KaA.-
perhaps a close relative of Kallixenos, son of Aris-
tonymos, whose name appears frequently on ostraca of the late 
48o•s of the fifth century. 2 A third reads KA.1.0-&tvc:~ ~p1..avu(µo) 
and ma7 be interpreted either as Cleiathenes or Kallisthenes, son 
of Aristonymos.3 
In a pile of ostraca the name Acha.rnion Xypetaion appears 
'Axa:pvCov (Xov~a't'a1.o)vov , a person not otherwise known. His 
4 
name is unusual, hitherto reported only once. He was evidently 
active in politics in the 480's of the fifth centur7, and two os-
traca bear his name.5 The ostraca were found on March 28, 1935, 
1H. A. Thompson, "Excavations of the Athenian Agora," 
Hesperia, XVII (1948), 193-194. 
2!111a., P• 193· 3lli.!i. 4I.G. II2 , 7098. 
5vanderpool, op. cit., p. 394. 
in Section B in the fill of the Porua Building South of the Tha-
l 1os. The pottery from this fill was mostl1 of the early fifth 
centur1, though there were also fragments as late as about 420. 
The fill was probably a 11Perserschutt 11 that was dug up in the 
last quarter of the fifth century and re-used as fill in the 
Porus building. It contained 56 ostraca, all but one of them 
early. 2 These have the names of Themistocles (15), Kallixenos 
(7), Hipparchos (6), Aristeides (6), Xanthippos (5), Boutalion 
(3), Megacles (2), Hippocrates Alkmeonidon (2), Hippocrates 
Anaxileo (2), Habron Hierocl(es), Kydrocles, Eratyllos, Dion1sios 
and Acharnion, one each.3 
On June 12, 1939, in a deposit of sand in shallow channel 
in bedrock at the ver1 bottom of the Great Drain which follows the 
bottom of the valley between the Areopagus and Kolonus Agoraius 
a deposit of ostraca was found containing the following names: 
Andronicko(s) (1). This person is not identified, although the 
name is not uncommon. There is no instances of it known from the 
fifth century. 4 The circumstances however of finding this single 
ostracon with the name shows that the man was active in politics 
in the 480 1 s of the fifth century. The other names that appear on 
ostraca are Themistocles (69), Kallixenus (45), Hippocrates Alk-
1H. A. Thompson, HesReria, Supplement IV (1940), p. 44. 
2 Vanderpool, op. cit., PP• 394-395. 
3Among them one ostracon of the later fifth century with 
the name of Charias of Paianieus which may well have been cast in 
the ostracophoria of 417 was found in a disturbed part of this 
fill. 
4 lRi4•t P• 395. 
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meonidon Alopekethen (44), Aristides (2), Kydrocles (2), llabron 
(1), Eratyllus (1),a son of Hippocrates (1), and uncertain (6).1 
Found on February 21, 1938 in Section Z imbedded in the 
foundation of the North Wall of the Archaic building north of the 
Tholos was the fragment of an ostracon from the wall of a large 
closed pot with thin red glaze on the outside. The inscription is 
scratched on the inside Al)EXE\IO~ r;i? LA.ocroc:vo (v) not otherwise 
known. We only gather that he must have been active in politics 
in the 480 1 s of the fifth century as the circumstances of the dis-
covery finding the sherd bearing his name indioate. 2 Another 
sherd was found near the road leading to the southwest corner of 
the Agora on June 11, 1935, in a mixed fill. The area of the fill 
produced many early fifth century ostraca. The letter forms sug-
gest early fifth century but the names cannot be restored with 
certainty (Arist----- Charop ).3 An inscription bearing the 
name Arista (ichmos?) Timo {Kratous) is suspected to refer to the 
4 brother of Kydrokes mentioned above. Two ostraca have been found 
for a certain Dionysius --- onou, who cannot be further identified. 
His own name is clear but that of his father's is doubtful.5 The 
archaeological circumstances of finding the ostraca indicate again 
the 48o•s of the fifth century. 6 Eight other ostraca found in the 
2 ~., PP• 395-396. 3~., P• 396. 
4 See p. 98, above. 
5vanderpool (op. cit., pp. 396-397) suggests it could be 
Antigonos. 
6~., P• 397. 
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same deposit bear t4e names of Themistocles, Kallixenus, Hippocra-
tes Alkmeonido~, Kydrocles and possibly Megacles. In a pile near 
the New Bouleuterion {Section B), on April 17, 1934, were found 
three ostraca the circumstances of which again indicate a date in 
the 480's of the fifth century. The name on the ostraca is Era-
tyllus Kattariou. Who this person was is not known. The name it-
1 
self is rare and reported only once. Kattarias however is not 
reported, the name is unknown. 2 
The oases can be extended.3 There are, however, some in-
teresting possibilities that deserve to be mentioned. Hegestratus, 
son of Ba.simion who cannot be otherwise identified. The letter 
forms and the circumstances of the finding of the one of two os-
traca with hie name indicate a date in the early fifth century. A 
certain Hegestratus was Archon in 559/8 B.C. As the name is a 
rare one, it is not improbable that Archon Hegestratus is a descen-
4 dant, perhaps a grandson of our Hegestratus, who was politically 
active in the early part of the century. 
Three ostraca of the early fifth century mention Melanthi-
us Phalanthou. The nature of the ostraca are common to the early 
fifth century. According to Berodotus,5 Melanthius waa the name 
ot the leader of the Athenian fleet of twenty ships dispatched to 
Miletus in 498 in support of the Ionian revolt. The ostraca 
6 therefore may refer to him. The 480•s will be the logical period 
1~. 2~. for the details of this excavation. 
3see Appendix, pp. 117-122. 
4 Vanderpool, op. cit., pp. 399-400. 
5 Hdt V, 97,3. 6vanderpool, op. cit., p. 400. 
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of the ostraca since the other pro-Persian leaders were ostracized 
during this time. That means that the war party of Miltiades and 
Themistocles had cause to be displeased with the performance of 
Melanthius during the Ionian revolt. Of course, it could also be 
that Melanthius belonged to the appeasement party in the 490's and 
48o•s. This exacerbated further the feelings of the war party 
against him. 
The name most frequently mentioned on the ostraca found so 
far is the name of Themistocles. This is only befitting the na-
ture of this intriguing man who was fina.117 ostracized in the late 
l seventies of the fifth century. Themistocles' ostracism in 472-1 
was hardly the first attempt made to oust him. His turbulent 
political career as the leader of the popular party and his vio-
lent and wily nature brought him into constant clash with the op-
posing groups headed by men like Hipparchus, Megacles, Xa.nthippus, 
and Aristides who all went to excile in the 480•s largely with the 
aid of the machinations of Themistocles and the war group. Ostraca 
1There is no absolute certainty for the date of his exile. 
One opinion based on Thuc7dides (I, 137) is that he was ostracized 
about 472 .. 1 that the charge of complicity with Pausanias was 
brought against him about 466 and that he fled to Persia about 
465, the year in which Artaxerxes succeeded Xerxes. From the evi-
dence o! Aristotle (Ath. Pol. 25, 3-5) on the other hand, it ap. 
pears that he was in Athens in 462, and his ostracism cannot be 
consequently placed earlier than 462 and his flight to Persia 
about 460. This is irreconcilable with the statement of Thucydi-
des (I, 137) tha~ in his flight was almost seized by the Atheni-
ans engaged in the siege of Naxos which is generally assigned to 
the year 466 and most critics reject Aristotle's version. Oscar 
Broneer, "Excavations on the Borth Slope of the Acropolis, .. 
Hesperia, VII (1938), 242-24}. See C. A. Robinson, Jr., "The 
Date of Themistocles Ostracism," ~' LXVII (1964, 265-266. 
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bearing his name were found also in a well alongside with those of 
Aristides, 1 which means that he was a candidate along with Aristi-
des. 
Kallixenos' name, son of Aristonymua from the deme of 
Xypete, appears on no less than 251 ostraca. He thus ranks second 
only to Themistocles as the statesman whose name appears most fre-
2 quently on the ostraca discovered up to 1950. All of the ostraca 
of Kallixenus were found in the Agora but not all come from a sin-
gle deposit. The wide spread of the ostraca and the large numbers 
indicate that we deal with a man very active in the political af-
fairs of the city, for whose ostracism a concerted campaign must 
have been conducted in the ecclesia. In only a few instances the 
name of Kallixenus appears alone on an ostracon. In the great 
majority of sherds the name is accompanied by the patronymic, 
Aristonimou. On one ostracon (Nr. 29) the voter has scratched a 
head in a profile to the right, a head with a wreath and a long 
pointed beard. To the right on the head the name has been written 
in three lines Ka:A.A.1.(xoc;v)o~ without the patrary.mic. The ques-
tion then can be posed: Who was he? When did he live and why so 
many votes against him? There seems to be no question about his 
date. Many ostraca have been found in the same deposit along with 
oatraca of Aristides, Themistocles, and Hippocrates son of Alcmeon-
ids, to mention only a few. Vanderpool, after close study of the 
1 Broneer, "Excavations on the North Slope of the Acropo-
lis," op. cit., pp. 242-243. 
2George Stamires and Eue;ene Vanderpool, "Kallixenos the 
Alkmeonid, 11 Hesperia, XIX (1950), 376. 
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rectangular rock-cup in which the ostraca were found, attempted to 
fix the date as closely as possible. He suggested that Kallixenus 
may have been one of the principal 11 candidates" for ostracism in 
483, though votes may have been cast against hill on other occa-
1 
sions. To Professor Vanderpool it seems probable that the major-
ity of the ostraca on Kallixenus date from the ostracism of 482. 2 
Another ostracon3 gives evident that enables us to identify his 
family. The clan or family is (ALK) meon (idou). He therefore be-
longs to the great and well-known family of the Alcmeonids. From 
other sources we know that the name Aristonymus was borne by the 
grandfather of Agariste of Sicyon who was married into the Alcmeon-
4 id family in an earlier generation. The use of the name of a 
Sicyonian forebearer would be quite a normal parallel in the case 
of Kleisthenes, the legislator. The precise place of Aristonymus 
in the Alcmeonid family is not sure, but he could have been an un-
known younger brother of Cleisthenes5 who had established himself 
in Xypete some time before the reform of 5o8/7. There is another 
alternative that he may be connected with the female line. 
Before I close this short excursion into the turbulent 
1H. A. Thompson, 11Excavationa in the Athenian Agora: 
1959," Hesperia, XIX (1950), 396-399. 
2~. Thompson, Hesperia, Supplement IV, op. cit., pp. 
32-33· Carcopino,-op. cit., P• 150. QA!!, IV, 153 tor the date of 
Aristides ostracism. 
24. 
3'1'hompaon, Hesperia, Supplement IV, op. cit., p. 32, fig. 
4 Hdt VI, 126,1. 
5stamires and Vanderpool, op. cit., p. 378. 
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period of 510-480, I would like to mention briefly the problem of 
Alkibiades the so-called Elder, who was supposedly ostracized in 
485 after Megacles. The whole argument has risen from the short 
and unclear statement of Aristotle, "that for three yea.rs they 
exiled the friends of tyrants, on account of whom the ostracism 
1 
was intended." The statement is lacking in clarity for several 
reasons. Aristotle does not say how Megacles and Hippocrates 
were friends of the tyrant. He names the two ostracized persons 
but does not name the third, if, that is, the Athenians ostra-
cized three persons in three consecutive years. Further, he does 
not explain if he means that the interval between the ostracism 
of Hipparchus and that of Megacles was three years, let us say 
from 488 to 486, with no one for 487. The situation has produced 
a great deal of conjecturing, but there is no safe way to estab-
lish clear historicity of the facts to date. Vanderpool rejects 
the notion of the exile for the Elder Alkibiades in 487. 2 He 
suggests two other possibilities for the year. Archaeological 
evidence indicates} that Boutalion of Marathon and Hippocrates, 
son of Anaxileos, were both candidates for ostracism in the middle 
48o•s. He rules out Boutalion as an insignificant upstarter. This 
leaves Hippocrates, the sone of Anaxileos, an aristocrat perhaps 
1 Ath. Pol• 22,6. 
2:E. Vanderpool, "The Ostracism of the Elder Alkibiades," 
Hes~eria, XXI (1952), 4. 
-1:. Vanderpool, H!fhe Rectangular Rook-cut Sha.ft,tt Hesperia, 
xv (1946), 272. 
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connected with the great Alcmeonid family directly or indirectly. 
It may well have been then that he was the victim of ostracism in 
485 following Megacles in exile. If such is the case then Aris-
totle's statement above may be taken to mean that in three consec-
utive years the Athenians banished three alleged friends of the 
tyrant. 
The ostracism of Alcibiades is not, however, certain. 
Outside of the archaeological evidence1 we have also written evi-
2 dence. Andocides claims that Alcibiades the Younger's both grand-
fathers were ostracized. If one allows about thirty years per gen~ 
eration, Alcibiades' grandfather must have been a ripe man in the 
480 1 s and probably active in politics like many members of the 
prominent families of Athens. Hence his ostracism in the 480 1s is 
a probability. The exact year of his exile remains nevertheless a 
conjecture. Unfortunately Aristotle's evidence is not clear enough 
to clarify matters. The reasons for the so-called Alcibiades 
Elder's ostracism are not given. If one accepts Alcibiades as the 
third consecutive person to be ostracized in the 480 1 s and Aris-
totle's nebulous statement that the Athenians exiled for three 
years the friends of the tyrants, then Alcibiades along with the 
other Alcmeonids had supported the family's policy vis-A-via Persia. 
Andocides states that both grandparents' activities were reprehen-
sible. "Not even he himself would have dared say, that they (his 
1vanderpool, 11 The Ostracism of the Elder Alkibiades," 2E.:. 
cit., P• 4. 
- 2Andocides, Against Alcibiades, 34. 
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grandfathers) were not violators of the law. 111 This clearly re-
fers to their public actions, political activities to be specific, 
since there was no law of ostracism for moral crimes. 2 But what 
was it exactly for which they have been condemned? Andocides 
does not specify. And so the controvers1 continued. 
1~. Translation is mine. 
2 KaC µDV ouo'&v av~6, lnLXELp~OELEV &v~L~Etv, 
~' ob ~~v ~AAwv iKEtvoL napavoµ~~a~oL 5v~£, ••• 
For Andocies' interpretation of ostracism see ~., p. 35. 
EPILOGUE 
There has been a strong streak of moderation running 
throughout the entire gamut of Greek political histo1'7• Man1 of 
the enduring political acts of the Greeks were mainl1 due to the 
moderation that prevailed at man1 critical junctures of Greek 
political life. The reforms of Solon were the product of a polit-
ically moderate man who composed his changes in the spirit of tem-
perance. Solon might not have been able to satisfy all parties 
concerned, but his work found acceptance because of its temperate 
nature. Pisistratus' "tyrannical" regime was tolerated at the end 
exactly because hie t1ranny was not really tyrannical, in the 
strict interpretation of the word. His government proved to be 
mild and moderate. Pisistratus died in his bed. The general con-
sensus among ancient and modern historians of Greek affairs is that 
his period was a period of positive returns in Athenian political 
history. Pisistratus has been universally praised in spite of the 
fact that he was a usurper and his role was unconstitutional. 
Cleisthenes' reforms were written in the same vein of moderation 
that distinguished the periods of his two predecessors, Solon and 
Pisistratus. The result was that Cleisthenes• political acumen 
paid dividends. His constitution became the basis of the Athenian 
state during the most glorious period of its history. 
There was, on the other hand, an overwhelming trend of 
political irrationality, political fanaticism, and blind extremism. 
It manifested itself constantly in Greek life and disturbed deeply 
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the normal processes of the political functions of the Athenian 
city-life and for that matter practically all of Greek city-life, 
with the exception of Sparta. This extremism was chiefly due to 
the emotional character of the Greek citizen. The Greeks failed 
repeatedl7 to harness their emotions for the sake of moderation 
and reason. As it often happens in such cases, the entire commu-
nity suffered from the erratic political malady. The common man 
was hurt as often as were the political leaders. In a puerile 
fashion, the common voter refused to accept his share of responsi-
bility for decisions which were freely debated and commonly re-
solved in the ecclesia. Consequently, the leader who rode high 
on the popular wave yesterday found himself the next day deprived 
of his office and power and was expelled for ten years of his life 
or variously punished and ridiculed. The Athenians resorted to 
such extreme measures not for any major constitutional violation, 
omissions, or deceits bUt for proposals and bills passed openly by 
the sovereign body of the ecclesia only because these bills did 
not always measure up to the expectations of the bill's sponsor 
and the voting assembly. The political leaders themselves were 
not entirely innocent of the sanctions imposed upon them by the 
immature citizenry because they inflamed the voters when they 
should have been soothing them. They exhibited the eame weaknesses 
that the man on the street did, when they were expected to lift 
themselves above the shortsightedness of the common m:an. 
The political imbroglios of the period following Solon's 
reforms led to the unconstitutional solution of Pisistratus' re-
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gime because this regime provided an alternative to the exaaperat-
ing behavior of the political factions of the Solonian democracy. 
Pisistratus provided a break-through in the stalemate to which the 
Solonian democracy had fallen. Be seemed to be able to get the 
state business moving again after the impasse to which the state 
had been forced because of the political anarchy and chaos which 
had been brought about by the constant squabbling of the political 
parties. Pisistratus struck roots because he used power with mod-
eration. His sons were removed from office because they resorted 
to political repressions. But Isagoras who succeeded Hippias be-
came guilty of acts of political extremism. He ignored the golden 
rule of moderation. As a result, he, too, was soon removed from 
office. The incident served to teach Cleisthenes a lesson. Cleis-
thenes, undoubtedly, capitalized on Isagoras' errors. His middle-
of-the-road reforms created the climate of political tranquility 
which was so badly needed for the absorption of Cleisthenes' meas-
urea. Unfortunately, the political tranquility did not last very 
long. New issues appeared which stirred up the Athenians. Some 
of these issues were concerned with foreign policy on which depend-
ed the viability of the Athenian Democracy--indeed the survival of 
the whole of Greece. The Athenians encountered these problems 
with the same lack of common sense and the same deep passions wh~ch 
had marred their political existence earlier. A new set of politi-
cal leaders employed the issues of the day to arouse the excitable 
Athenians. Old personal hatreds, petty jealousies, emotional over~ 
' 
reactions were now intertwined with vital internal and external 
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lems which fanned the people's political fanaticism. In their 
anger, the Athenians turned to a dormant political weapon, ostra-
cism, and, as usual, they made excessive and abusive use of it. 
Ostracism was originally invented to protect the constitution from 
would-be violators. Now it was used by the stronger to eliminate 
the weaker. It was thus turned against excellence while leaving 
mediocrity to reign supreme. It is a wonder that the Athenians 
were able to weather the crises of the 490's and the 48o•s as ad-
mirably as they did. This feat was due to a great extent to a 
political leader who finally suffered from the same excesses that 
he had imposed upon others earlier. His case was a flagrant exam-
ple of the case that I have tried to build in this paper. The man 
who saved Greece in her hour of peril almost singlehandedly fell 
victim to that fanaticism so characteristic of the Greeks. 
The Athenians, like the rest of the Greeks, never managed 
to reach that point of political maturation and composure that 
would have enabled them to develop their political history in a 
gradually ascending manner. Because of this weakness, they were 
never able to evolve some comprehensive political forethought and 
plan which would have made their life easier and their hold in the 
geographical area stronger. Had they matured politically with the 
lapse of time, the history of the Ancient Near East might have 
taken a different turn. 
APPENDIX 
Supplementary Note A 
Vanderpool1 discusses a sherd found with the name of 
Pisistratus inscribed on it. The sherd was an eighth-century 
geometric piece. The filling in which it has been found says 
nothing helpful toward its identification. Professor Vanderpool 
thinks that it could belong to the mid-sixth century, referring 
to Pisistratus the tyrant. Pisistratus went to exile on two occa-
sions, and it may be that he was banished by a vote of the Areo-
pagus. 2 Areopagus would be in this case the logical body to ban-
ish Pisistratus, since it was charged under the Solonian Constitu-
tion with the duty of protecting the laws and particularly with 
trying persons who conspired to overthrow the democracy.3 Since 
there is no mention of a military coup for the overthrow of Pisis-
tratus, the expulsion must have been done in some legal form, the 
voting being done on sherds, one of which has been bequeathed to 
4 
us by coincidence. 
The name Aristion appeared on another early sherd. It is 
1vanderpool, "Some Ostraca from the Athenian Agora," 2l?.:. 
cit., P• 407. 
-
2 Bdt I, 60,1. Atp. Pol• 14,3, 
3Ath. Pol. 8. 
Ka c 't0-6~ E'JG c }(.Q:'tCXA~O'E I. 'tOV otiµov O''UV 1.cri;a:µt 
vou~ ~~pi.vc:v, ~6Awvo~ ~tv'to~ voµov c:taa:yyc:A.(a:~ 
nc:p C atrcwv. 
4 Vanderpool, "Some Ostraca from the Athenian Agora, 11 2l?.:. 
ill•• P• 407. 
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worth recalling that a man named Aristion was one of Pisistratus' 
supporters, and that it was on his motion that the people voted 
Pisistratus the bodyguard, which paved the way for the first tyr-
1 
anny. If Pisistratus was exiled, it seems sure that such a sup-
porter would have been exiled along with the tyrant. 2 
l Ath. Ppl. 14,1. How and Wells, OE• cit,, P• 82. 
2Vanderpool, "Some Ostraca from the Athenian Agora, 11 21?.:. 
cit., P• 407. 
-
Supplementary Note B 
Eukrates. It is not altogether known if the sherd bearing 
his name is an ostracon. The name cannot be identified with cer-
tainty, but he may possibly be Eukrates the father of Diodotus who 
1 spoke in defense of the people of Mytilene in 427 B.C. The letter 
forms suggest a date in the first half of the fifth century, though 
rather improbable that he was a candidate for ostracism in the 
480 1 a. It would be too early a date. 2 
1 Thuc. III, 41. 
2Vanderpool, "Some Ostraca from the Athenian Agora,n 21?.:. 
cit., p. 400. 
-
Supplementary Note C 
Hierokl---Herma- The name cannot be easily identified. It 
could be Hierokles or Bierokleidea. Letter forms and circumstances 
suggest a date in the early fifth century and probably ill the 
48o•s.1 His father's name also is unidentifiable. 
1 
n.li•t P• 400. 
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Supplementary Note D 
Kritias Leaidou is another name that cannot be easily 
identified. The circumstances of finding one of the ostraca with 
his name show that he was active in politics in the 48o•s of the 
fifth century. The name Kritias is not a common name. It has 
been reported from only two Athenian families, Plato's family on 
his mother's side, 1 and Kritias of Aphidnai, father of Apolodoros, 
who was one of the treasurers of Athens 432/1. 2 It does not seem 
possible to connect our Kritias with either of the above. 
Supplementary Note E 
Laispodias of Koile. The name is a common one.1 Baubit. 
schek suggested that this La.ispodias is the sone of Spudis who 
made a dedication on the.Acropolis. There is, however, no exter-
nal evidence for this. Letter forms and circumstances indicate 
the first half of the fifth century as a date of the ostracon. A 
date in the 480 1 s is quite appropriate. 2 
1A Raubitschek cited~., p. 400 ftn. 19. 
2 ~·t P• 400. 
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Supplementary Note F 
Table of Ostraca found at the Agora in 1947: 
Acharnion Xypetaion l 
Alkibiades Cleiniou Skambonides 
(the elder) 1 
Arist. Lysimachou Alopekethen 4 
Charias Ph--dou (A---+ 1 
Habron Patrocleous Marathonios 2 
Hippocrates Alkm. Alopehethan 42 
Hippocrates (uncertain) 11 
Hyperbolus Antiphanius (Perithoides) 1 
Kallixenus Aristonymon Xypetaion 148 
Kallixenus (?) Kleisthenous l 
Kleisthenes (?) Aristonymou 1 
Megacles Hippocratous Alopelethen 2 
Themistocles Neocleous Phrearriua 158 
+This name from letter form and circumstances aug-
gests that the person was active in the early fifth 
century. Not similar to Paianieus. 
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